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ALLOCATION OF BURDENS IN MURDER-VOLUNTARY
MANSLAUGHTER CASES: AN AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSE APPROACH
JAMES B. HADDAD*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Illinois today, as at common law, and under most modem
American statutes, the only difference between voluntary manslaughter
and murder is the presence of mitigating circumstances that suffice to
reduce the grade of the homicide.' The drafters of the 1961 Illinois
Criminal Code created confusion in attempting to make this distinc-
tion. They defined the offense of murder without reference to the ab-
sence of circumstances which reduce the offense to voluntary
manslaughter.2 They included as an element of voluntary manslaugh-
ter the presence of those mitigating circumstances which distinguish
voluntary manslaughter from murder.3
* B.A. University of Notre Dame; J.D., LL.M. Northwestern University. Professor of Law,
Northwestern University. The author has served as a member of the Illinois Pattern Jury Instruc-
tions (Criminal) Committee since 1974. The views expressed are his own and not that of the
Committee.
1. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 9-1, 9-2 (1981), infra notes 2 and 3. See generally W.
LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW §§ 75-77, at 571-86 (1972) and Patterson v.
New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
2. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(a) (1981) defines murder:
A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits murder if, in
performing the acts which cause the death:
(I) He either intends to kill or do great bodily harm to that individual or another,
or knows that such acts will cause death to that individual or another; or
(2) He knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily
harm to that individual or another; or
(3) He is attempting or committing a forcible felony other than voluntary
manslaughter.
3. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-2 defines voluntary manslaughter:
(a) A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits voluntary
manslaughter if at the time of the killing he is acting under a sudden and intense passion
resulting from serious provocation by:
(1) The individual killed, or
(2) Another whom the offender endeavors to kill, but he negligently or acciden-
tally causes the death of the individual killed. Serious provocation is conduct sufficient
to excite an intense passion in a reasonable person.
(b) A person who intentionally or knowingly kills an individual commits volun-
tary manslaughter if at the time of the killing he believes the circumstances to be such
that, if they existed, would justify or exonerate the killing under the principles stated in
Article 7 of this Code, but his belief is unreasonable.
Occasionally decisions declare that intoxication can reduce the offense of murder to the offense of
voluntary manslaughter (but not lower to the offense of involuntary manslaughter). See, e.g.,
People v. Proper, 68 Ill. App. 3d 250, 385 N.E.2d 882 (1979). Thus, there appears to be a third
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Literally adhering to these statutory definitions, with little gui-
dance from the judiciary, the drafters of the Illinois Pattern Jury In-
structions have prepared jury instructions which make it irrelevant to a
charge of murder whether the killing was accompanied by the statutory
mitigating circumstances specified in the voluntary manslaughter stat-
ute.4 These instructions also direct the jury to find the defendant guilty
of voluntary manslaughter only if it determines that the prosecution
has proved beyond a reasonable doubt every element of murder plus
the presence of the statutorily defined mitigating circumstances. 5 Thus,
if juries obeyed these instructions when both murder and voluntary
type of mitigating circumstance (in addition to passion-provocation and imperfect justification)
which reduces murder to voluntary manslaughter. However, there is no statutory basis for such a
category under the 1961 Criminal Code. Decisions like Proper are anachronisms which have a
true place only in an earlier era when a certain level of intoxication was thought to negate the
"malice" necessary for murder. See generally note 108 infra.
4. See I.P.I. §§ 7.02, 7.04, 7.06 (Crim.) (2d ed. 1981), carefully comparing the propositions
essential for murder and those essential for voluntary manslaughter of either the passion-provoca-
tion type or the imperfect justification type. Note that proof of voluntary manslaughter necessar-
ily establishes every proposition needed for a murder conviction.
7.02 Issues in Murder
To sustain the charge of murder, the State must prove the following propositions:
First: That the defendant performed the acts which caused the death of
-; and
Second: That when the defendant did so,
[1] he intended to kill or do great bodily harm to
or
[2] he knew that his act would cause death or great bodily harm to -
or
[3] he knew that his acts created a strong probability of death or great
bodily harm to - ;
or
[4] he [(was attempting to commit) (was committing)] the offense of-
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each one of
these propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should
find the defendant guilty.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any one of
these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should
find the defendant not guilty.
5. See I.P.I. (Crim.) (2d ed. 1981) §§ 7.04, 7.06
7.04 Issues in Voluntary Manslaughter-Provocation
To sustain the charge of voluntary manslaughter, the State must prove the following
propositions:
First: That the defendant performed the acts which caused the death of
-; and
Second: That when the defendant did so,
[I] he intended to kill or do great bodily harm to
or
[2] he knew that such acts would cause death or great bodily harm to -
or
[31 he knew that such acts created a strong probability of death or great
bodily harm to - and
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manslaughter were in issue, they would never find a defendant guilty of
voluntary manslaughter without also finding him guilty of murder.6
The statutory definitions of murder and voluntary manslaughter
also have engendered confusion in the Illinois case law. Although
some very able appellate jurists have commented upon the problem,
none has given extended treatment to or fully identified the contradic-
tory propositions of law which appear in Illinois decisions concerning
murder and voluntary manslaughter. 7 This article identifies the nu-
merous anomalies and tensions in Illinois concerning the relationship
between murder and manslaughter. It then treats the practical conse-
quences of the anomalies as they emerge in a typical trial where the
jury is directed to consider both murder and voluntary manslaughter.
Third: That when the defendant did so,
[1] he acted under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious
provocation by another,
or
[2] he acted under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious
provocation by some other person he endeavored to kill, but he negli-
gently or accidentally killed
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each one of
these propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should
find the defendant guilty.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any one of
these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should
find the defendant not guilty.
7.06 Issues in Voluntary Manslaughter-Intentional-Belief of Justification
To sustain the charge of voluntary manslaughter, the State must prove the
following propositions:
First: That the defendant performed the acts which caused the death of-
-; and
Second: That when defendant did so,
[1] he intended to kill or do great bodily harm to
or
[2] he knew that his acts would cause death or great bodily
harm to
or
[3] he knew that his acts created a strong probability of death
or great bodily harm to ; and
Third: That when the defendant did so he believed that circum-
stances existed which would have justified killing ; and
Fourth: That the defendant's belief that such circumstances ex-
isted was unreasonable.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each
one of these propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, you should find the defendant guilty.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any
one of these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, you should find the defendant not guilty.
6. If a jury adheres to the pattern instructions, a voluntary manslaughter conviction signifies
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each of the three propositions of § 7.04 or each of the four
propositions of § 7.06. Proof of the first two propositions of § 7.04 or of § 7.06 is all that is re-
quired to support a murder conviction under § 7.02. See notes 4 and 5 supra.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 20-24.
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The article next discusses the problems which arise in a bench trial
where the charge is murder but the court also considers the lesser of-
fense of voluntary manslaughter. It then treats issues arising in that
rare bench or jury trial where the sole homicide charge is voluntary
manslaughter.
As a solution to the problems encountered during trial, and as a
means of ridding Illinois case law of contradictory principles, the arti-
cle proposes that the statutory mitigating circumstances be treated as a
partial affirmative defense which reduces murder to voluntary man-
slaughter. The article then addresses the difficult issue of how to adopt
this reallocation of burdens while still allowing prosecutors the impor-
tant option of charging voluntary manslaughter, rather than murder,
when fairness so requires.
The article suggests a statutory amendment which would facilitate
its proposed solutions. Nevertheless, after reviewing the case law con-
cerning allocation of burdens, it also argues that the judiciary can and
should fill the present legislative vacuum. The article proposes that the
drafters of the Illinois Pattern Instructions serve as a catalyst for judi-
cial consideration of the issues by modifying the present instructions.
It concludes by providing sample jury instructions which reflect the
proposed reallocation of burdens and which may be used whether that
reallocation is achieved through the judicial or the legislative process.
II. THEORETICAL ANOMALIES IN THE MURDER-VOLUNTARY
MANSLAUGHTER RELATIONSHIP
Scores of Illinois decisions declare that the offense of voluntary
manslaughter is included in the offense of murder." Until 1981, no ap-
pellate opinion questioned this proposition.9 Nevertheless, this princi-
ple conflicts with the statutory definition of "included offense" and
with a line of decisions that declare that sometimes proof sufficient to
support a finding of murder fails to establish the elements of voluntary
manslaughter.
According to the statutory definition,' 0 one offense is included in
8. See, e.g., People v. Speed, 52 Ill. 2d 141, 284 N.E.2d 636 (1972), People v. Pierce, 52 Ill.
2d 7, 284 N.E.2d 279 (1972), and cases cited in those opinions. See also People v. Korycki, 45 Ill.
2d 87, 256 N.E.2d 798 (1970).
9. In People v. March, 95 Ill. App. 3d 46, 60, 419 N.E.2d 1212, 1222 (1981) (Green, J.,
concurring), Justice Fred Green briefly and tentatively suggested that voluntary manslaughter is
not included in murder. See infra text accompanying notes 132-33.
10. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 2-9 (1981) reads:
"included offense" means an offense which
(a) Is established by proof of the same or less than all of the facts or a less culpable
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another only if the first offense has no element which is not also an
element of the second offense. In Illinois, under this definition, volun-
tary manslaughter is not included in murder. According to the 1961
Illinois Criminal Code, the presence of either of two types of mitigating
circumstances is an element of voluntary manslaughter. I To sustain a
conviction of "subsection A" voluntary manslaughter, the prosecution
must establish circumstances summarized by the expression "passion-
provocation."' 2 To sustain conviction of "subsection B" voluntary
manslaughter, the prosecution must establish circumstances summa-
rized by the expression "imperfect justification."' 13
On the other hand, the statutory definition of murder makes no
reference to such circumstances.' 4 Accordingly, to sustain a murder
conviction, the prosecution need not prove the presence of such circum-
stances.' 5 Their presence or absence is irrelevant to a murder charge.
Voluntary manslaughter, containing an element which is not also an
element of murder, is therefore not included within murder.
Additionally, Illinois opinions often declare that sometimes the ev-
idence would support either a conviction of murder, or an acquittal,
but would not support a conviction of voluntary manslaughter. 16 These
mental state (or both), than that which is required to establish the commission of the
offense charged, or
(b) Consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or an offense included
therein.
This article is not concerned with § 2-9(b). Nor does the author find it necessary to treat the
variety of meanings of "included offense" which are discussed in People v. Mays, 91 111. 2d 251,
437 N.E.2d 633 (1982). Voluntary manslaughter is not included in murder under any of the inter-
pretations of § 2-9 treated in Mays because (1) the abstract statutory definition of voluntary man-
slaughter includes an element not included in the abstract definition of murder, (2) a murder
indictment does not include an allegation of facts sufficient to allege that element of voluntary
manslaughter, and (3) the proof introduced to establish murder ordinarily does not establish the
added element of voluntary manslaughter.
I1. See supra note 3. See also People v. Bailey, 56 Ill. App. 2d 261, 205 N.E.2d 756 (1965),
and other decisions which, in holding or dictum, accept the proposition that some evidence will
suffice to support a murder conviction but will not support a voluntary manslaughter conviction
for want of proof of passion-provocation or imperfect justification. The author treats these deci-
sions in the text accompanying notes 73-95 infra.
12. See supra notes 3 and 5.
13. Id
14. See supra note 2.
15. See supra note 4. See also People v. Barney, No. 80-2321 (Ill. App. Dec. 16, 1982) which
rejects the claim that voluntary manslaughter contains an element which murder does not, relying
on pre-1962 decisions and not analyzing the present statute or recent decisions.
16. See, e.g., People v. Fausz, 107 Ill. App. 3d 558, 437 N.E.2d 702 (1982), aff'd, No. 56940
(Ill. Mar. 25, 1983),petliton for reh'g pending (Fausz is discussed infra in the addendum to this
article); People v. Towers, 17 I11. App. 3d 467, 308 N.E.2d 223 (1974); People v. Thompson, I 111.
App. 3d 752, 297 N.E.2d 592 (1973); People v. Dodson, I 1 Ill. App. 3d 709, 297 N.E.2d 367 (1973);
People v. Bailey, 56 Ill. App. 2d 261, 205 N.E.2d 756 (1965) (decisions in which the appellants
have prevailed). See also People v. Odum, 3 Ill. App. 3d 538, 279 N.E.2d 12 (1972); People v.
Tucker, 3 Ill. App. 3d 152, 278 N.E.2d 516 (1971); People v. Barnett, 125 Ill. App. 2d 70, 260
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"murder-or-nothing" decisions reason that the prosecution's evidence,
if believed, would establish a knowing or intentional unjustified killing;
but they say that, no matter how credibility issues were resolved, the
evidence would not support a finding of the statutorily defined mitigat-
ing circumstances of passion-provocation or of imperfect justification. 17
It is impossible, however, to prove the "inclusive offense" without
proving the "included offense." To prove the former is, by definition,
to establish every element of the latter.' 8  If voluntary manslaughter
were included within murder, it would be impossible for the evidence
to establish every element of murder without also establishing every
element of voluntary manslaughter. Thus, the "murder-or-nothing"
decisions belie the notion that voluntary manslaughter is included
within murder.
Perhaps a declaration that voluntary manslaughter is included
within murder is innocuous if that proposition merely serves notice
upon a murder defendant that, depending upon the evidence, the trier
of fact may be allowed to decide whether the accused is guilty of volun-
tary manslaughter.' 9 If the proposition means more than is indicated
by such a limited functional definition, however, it simply is erroneous
to declare that voluntary manslaughter is included within murder.
One can assert more accurately that, under Illinois law, the offense
of murder is included within voluntary manslaughter. Assuming that
voluntary manslaughter, like murder, requires an unjustified inten-
N.E.2d 303 (1970); People v. Millet, 60 Il. App. 2d 22, 208 N.E.2d 670 (1965) (decisions in which
courts accept the proposition that proof of murder is inadequate to establish voluntary man-
slaughter, but then find proof of the elements of voluntary manslaughter).
17. Id Under recent decisions it is unlikely that a "murder-or-nothing" argument can suc-
ceed if self-defense is in issue. Courts have reasoned that if there is enough evidence to justify a
self-defense instruction and verdict (signifying a reasonable mistaken belief that the facts justified
a killing), there is enough evidence to justify a voluntary manslaughter-imperfect justification
instruction and verdict (signifying an unreasonable mistaken belief that the facts justified a kill-
ing). See People v. Lockett, 82 Ill. 2d 546, 413 N.E.2d 378 (1980). See also People v. Wright, 24
Ill. App. 3d 536, 321 N.E.2d 52 (1974); People v. Zertuche, 5 Il. App. 3d 303, 282 N.E.2d 201
(1972).
To the author, these latter decisions depend upon abstract analysis of language rather than
consideration of real situations. If the prosecution witness testifies that the alleged victim was
unarmed and made no threats, while the defendant testifies that the alleged victim pointed a gun
at the defendant and said the defendant was about to die, the court is faced with a situation which
could be murder or could be self-defense, depending upon an evaluation of credibility, but could
not be voluntary manslaughter. Older cases, ignored by those cited above, accepted a "murder-or-
nothing" argument in such situations. See, e.g., People v. Hall, 118 Ill. App. 2d 160, 254 N.E.2d
793 (1970).
18. See supra note 10.
19. People v. Speed, 52 Ill. 2d 141, 284 N.E.2d 636 (1972), rejected a claim that a murder
indictment does not serve as adequate notice of the charge of voluntary manslaughter. The appel-
lant's claim was predicated upon the fact that voluntary manslaughter has an element (passion-
provocation or imperfect justification) which is not an element of murder.
ALLOCATION OF BURDENS
tional or knowing killing, one must conclude that there is no element of
murder which is not also an element of voluntary manslaughter. 20 The
sole difference between the two offenses is that voluntary manslaughter
has an additional element: the presence of passion-provocation or of
imperfect justification. According to the statutory definition of in-
cluded offense, therefore, murder is included within voluntary
manslaughter. 2'
The Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions also bear witness to the un-
orthodox proposition that the offense of voluntary manslaughter in-
cludes the offense of murder. The issues instruction for murder
requires the prosecution to prove two elements. 22 The issues instruc-
tions for voluntary manslaughter require proof of these same two ele-
ments plus the additional element of passion-provocation or imperfect
justification. 23 Under these instructions, to sustain a murder convic-
tion, the prosecution need prove no proposition which it will not have
proved by establishing what is essential for a voluntary manslaughter
conviction. 24 Thus, the issues instructions for murder and voluntary
manslaughter imply that murder is included within voluntary
manslaughter.
The proposition that murder is included within voluntary man-
slaughter, however, conflicts not only with the judicial declaration that
voluntary manslaughter is included within murder; it also contradicts
two other lines of Illinois decisions. One series of cases declares that, in
reviewing a murder conviction, a court sometimes can rule that the evi-
dence is inadequate to support a murder finding, but will support a
voluntary manslaughter judgment.25 These decisions may assume that
20. The voluntary manslaughter statute, see supra note 3, does not appear to require that the
passion-provocation homicide be either intentional or knowing (as is required under ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1 (1981), see supra note 2) for all murders except felony murder. It seems absurd,
however, that a reckless act of homicide would constitute involuntary manslaughter, a Class 3
felony, while a reckless homicide performed in the heat of passion would be voluntary man-
slaughter, a Class 1 felony. Accordingly, the drafters of the Second Edition of the Illinois Pattern
Jury Instructions modified the voluntary manslaughter issue instruction to require the same
mental element as for murder. See supra note 5 and compare I.P.I. (Crim.) §§ 7.04, 7.06 (1st ed.
1970). See also People v. Simpson, 57 Ill. App. 3d 442, 373 N.E.2d 809, aff'd 74 I11. 2d 497, 384
N.E.2d 373 (1978), and Committee Comments, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1 (Smith-Hurd 1981),
suggesting that intent is an element of voluntary manslaughter.
21. See supra note 10.
22. See supra note 4.
23. See supra note 5.
24. Compare the text of § 7.02 (supra note 4) with the text of § 7.04 and § 7.06 (supra note 5).
25. See, e.g., People v. Ellis, 107 IUI. App. 3d 603, 437 N.E.2d 409 (1982); People v. Hudson,
71 Ill. App. 3d 504, 390 N.E.2d 5 (1979); People v. Walker, 55 Ill. App. 2d 292, 204 N.E.2d 594
(1965). See also the unusual case of People v. Goolsby, 45 II. App. 3d 441,359 N.E.2d 871 (1977),
aff'd after remand, 70 Ill. App. 3d 832, 388 N.E.2d 894 (1979). In Goolsby the jury signed verdicts
finding the defendant guilty of murder and not guilty of voluntary manslaughter. The appellate
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murder contains at least one element which voluntary manslaughter
does not. However, under the statutory definitions and the pattern in-
structions for the two offenses, this is not so.26 Because close analysis
reveals that murder is included within voluntary manslaughter, it is not
surprising that appellate decisions which reduce a murder conviction to
voluntary manslaughter do not identify the element of murder which
the evidence has failed to establish. Such decisions perhaps assume
that if the evidence fails to establish the absence of mitigating circum-
stances, then a court may not sustain a murder verdict. Under a literal
reading of the murder statute,27 and under the clear language of the
pattern instructions,28 however, this is not so. The presence or absence
of such mitigating circumstances is irrelevant to prove murder.
Another line of decisions also conflicts with the pattern instruc-
tions and with the proposition that to prove voluntary manslaughter is
necessarily to prove every element of murder. These opinions declare
that when a jury signs only a voluntary manslaughter verdict form after
also receiving a murder verdict form, it has impliedly acquitted the ac-
cused of murder.29 Yet if proof of voluntary manslaughter requires
proof of every element of murder, as it does under the pattern instruc-
tions, a verdict of voluntary manslaughter should not be read as an
implicit acquittal of murder. A conviction of the inclusive offense
(armed robbery, for example) is not an acquittal of the included offense
(robbery, for example). On the contrary, a conviction of the inclusive
offense implies a finding of guilty as to the included offense, for the
finding on the inclusive offense necessarily establishes the presence of
every element of the included offense. 30 Thus, according to the pattern
instructions, a conviction of voluntary manslaughter implies a finding
of every element of murder. If this is so, it cannot be reconciled with
court, nevertheless, reduced the grade of the offense to voluntary manslaughter. The court, in its
second opinion, justified its action by saying that the jury had acquitted the accused of imperfect-
justification manslaughter, but the court was reducing the murder to passion-provocation
manslaughter.
26. See supra notes 2-5.
27. See supra note 2.
28. See supra note 4.
29. See People v. Adams, 113 I11. App. 2d 205, 252 N.E.2d 35 (1969) (bench trial) and cases
cited therein. The rule that a manslaughter jury verdict is an implied acquittal of murder dates at
least to Brennan v. People, 15 Ill. 511 (1854). Brennan, like Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323 (1970),
decided a century later, prohibited re-trial on a murder charge following a manslaughter convic-
tion which had been reversed because of trial error.
30. Entry of a judgment and a sentence on both the including offense and the included of-
fense, however, would be prohibited. See, e.g., People v. Jones, 89 I11. App. 3d 1030, 412 N.E.2d
683 (1980).
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the proposition that a conviction of voluntary manslaughter is an im-
plied acquittal of murder.
III. PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES
The relationship between murder and voluntary manslaughter
under the Illinois Criminal Code of 1961 creates problems for those
who demand intellectual consistency. Even more importantly, the con-
ceptual inconsistencies in the law have practical manifestations in
homicide trials and appeals. This section of the article traces the
problems which arise in the various settings in which the trier of fact is
to determine whether the accused is guilty of voluntary manslaughter:
(A) the jury trial in which the court instructs on both murder and vol-
untary manslaughter; (B) the bench trial in which the court chooses
between a murder finding and a voluntary manslaughter finding; and
(C) the bench or jury trial where the sole intentional homicide charge is
voluntary manslaughter. It also considers appeals from convictions
where voluntary manslaughter and murder had been at issue in the
trial court.
A. Cases in Which the Jury is to Consider Both Murder and
Voluntary Manslaughter
For reasons discussed below, prosecutors usually charge murder
rather than voluntary manslaughter, even if they believe that the miti-
gating circumstances of passion-provocation or of imperfect justifica-
tion were present at the time of the homicide. 31 At trial on a murder
charge, the defense often attempts to establish mitigating circum-
stances. With "subsection A" voluntary manslaughter in mind, for ex-
ample, the defense tries to prove that the accused acted under a sudden
and intense passion upon being seriously provoked. The prosecution
attempts to disprove the presence of such mitigating circumstances.
Under the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, the court then tells the
jury, in effect, that the lawyers were wrong in suggesting that proof of
murder turns upon what the evidence shows with respect to passion-
provocation. The court defines murder and sets forth the issues as to
murder without referring to the presence or absence of such mitigating
circumstances. 32 Next, in defining voluntary manslaughter and the is-
sues on that charge, the court effectively tells the jurors that they erred
in their notion of the law gathered from the flow of the evidence and
3 1. See infra text accompanying notes 62-67.
32. See supra note 4.
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the arguments. It is the prosecution which must prove the presence of
passion-provocation beyond a reasonable doubt if the jury is to return
a voluntary manslaughter verdict. 33
A similar scenario occurs when the prosecution charges murder
and the defense claims imperfect justification. It is typical for defense
counsel to argue self-defense (a reasonable belief that facts existed
which would justify the killing), or, alternatively, voluntary man-
slaughter (an honest but unreasonable belief that circumstances were
such that the law permitted the accused to kill in his own defense). The
prosecution argues that the defendant could not have possibly believed,
reasonably or unreasonably, that such perilous conditions existed. The
court, however, then defines murder without reference to the presence
of such an actual but reasonable mistake.34 Next, it tells the jury that
the offense is not voluntary manslaughter unless the prosecution proves
beyond a unreasonable doubt the presence of such an unreasonable
mistake of circumstances. 35
These instructions are counterintuitive to anyone with knowledge
of the historical difference between murder and voluntary manslaugh-
ter.36 Moreover, they are surprising to a reader of the celebrated
United States Supreme Court decisions of the past decade concerning
burden of proof in murder-manslaughter cases. Mullaney v. Wilbur37
and Patterson v. New York 38 suggest two possible allocations: either
the prosecution must prove the absence of mitigating circumstances to
obtain a murder conviction, or the defense must establish the presence
of such circumstances in order to reduce murder to manslaughter. Illi-
nois has chosen a peculiar third alternative: the prosecution must
prove the presence of mitigating circumstances to obtain a manslaugh-
ter determination, but it may obtain a murder verdict regardless of who
proves what about the presence or absence of mitigating
circumstances. 39
If Illinois juries simply followed the flow of the evidence and the
arguments, ignored the courts' instructions, and allocated the burden
concerning mitigating circumstances as they saw fit (as apparently most
Illinois juries do in murder-voluntary manslaughter cases), those who
are concerned only with the practical would be untroubled. Some ju-
33. See § 7.04, supra note 5.
34. See supra note 4.
35. See § 7.06, supra note 5.
36. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
37. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
38. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
39. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
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ries, however, when the charge is a single count of murder, have found
an accused guilty of both murder and voluntary manslaughter. 40 The
possibility of such multiple verdicts apparently is so real that one sea-
soned trial jurist, in the absence of a broad legislative or reviewing
court reconsideration of the burden issue, has devised a method of
avoiding multiple verdicts. Judge James Bailey of Cook County tells
juries first to consider the murder charge and not even to consider the
voluntary manslaughter charge if they find the accused guilty of mur-
der.4' Whether his approach is correct under the current law42 is beside
the point made here: experienced judges realize that multiple verdicts
are a real possibility under the current Illinois jury instructions.
With the 1981 adoption of the second edition of the Illinois Pattern
Instructions, multiple verdicts of murder and voluntary manslaughter
are likely to increase. In the earlier edition, a sample set of instruc-
tions, prepared by the Honorable Prentice Marshall, had placed the
burden of proof on the prosecution to prove the absence of mitigating
circumstances in order to obtain a murder conviction. 43 The second
edition eliminated this sample, bringing the sample into conformity
with the pattern instructions in the I.P.I. homicide chapter. Thus, the
second edition's sample makes the presence of mitigating circum-
stances irrelevant to a charge of murder.44 At the same time, the new
sample instructions require the prosecution to prove an additional ele-
ment for voluntary manslaughter-the statutorily established mitigat-
ing circumstances. 45 The sample thus impliedly instructs the jury to
find the accused guilty of murder whenever it finds him guilty of volun-
tary manslaughter.
40. Two instances in which juries have found a defendant guilty of murder and voluntary
manslaughter (as to the same homicide) are reflected in reviewing court reports. See People v.
Stuller, 71 Ill. App. 3d 118, 389 N.E.2d 593 (1979); People v. Taylor, 36 Ill. App. 3d 898, 344
N.E.2d 742 (1976). At a recent meeting of the Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction Committee (Crimi-
nal) meeting, however, the judges and lawyers spoke of four additional Cook County cases in
which such verdicts had been returned recently. The author's conversations with several judges
suggest that in additional cases juries have returned verdicts of both murder and voluntary man-
slaughter. Because such multiple verdicts are rare, one must conclude that juries ordinarily do not
adhere to those instructions which would yield multiple verdicts.
41. See People v. Pastorino, 90 I11. App. 3d 921, 414 N.E.2d 54 (1980), rev'd 91 In. 2d 178,
435 N.E.2d 1144 (1982). Although no official statistics are published, Bailey has presided over
several hundred felony jury trials and, according to experienced Cook County prosecutors, he
probably has presided at more such jury trials than any of the other forty or so judges presently
assigned to the Cook County felony trial calendar on a full-time basis.
42. The Supreme Court of Illinois in Pasiorino, supra note 41, withheld judgment on Bailey's
method, vacating on other grounds the appellate court opinion which had criticized the approach.
See also People v. Barney, No. 80-2321 (Ill. App. Dec. 16, 1982).
43. See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
44. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
45. Id
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
Additionally, before adoption of the second edition, many judges
provided the jury with only three verdict forms: "Guilty of Murder,"
"Guilty of Voluntary Manslaughter," or "Not Guilty." They would
either orally instruct the jury to sign only one of these forms, or the jury
usually would infer that it was to choose only one form.46 The second
edition urges judges to provide a "Not Guilty" verdict form corre-
sponding to every "Guilty" verdict form.4 7 A jury that finds a defend-
ant guilty of voluntary manslaughter is now called upon to find the
defendant either guilty of murder or not guilty of murder. If the jurors
conscientiously follow the court's instructions in making this decision,
they must find the accused guilty of murder whenever they find him
guilty of voluntary manslaughter.4 8 As discussed previously, the volun-
tary manslaughter finding impliedly establishes the presence of every
element of murder.4 9
What judgment should a judge enter when the jury has found the
accused guilty of both murder and voluntary manslaughter in a case
involving only one death? In four recent unreported Cook County
cases, the trial judges have been divided equally, two sentencing for
murder, and two sentencing for voluntary manslaughter.50 The sparse
appellate rulings are of little help.5'
If the current pattern instructions represent true law, it appears
that the courts should sentence for murder. As discussed previously,
46. See, e.g., People v. Lewis, 5 Ill. App. 3d 109, 366 N.E.2d 446 (1977) (defendant not
prejudiced by failure to give fourth verdict form). The practice of giving a "guilty" form corre-
sponding to each possible guilty verdict but only a single "not guilty" form apparently was com-
mon and frequently had been upheld. See People v. Pavic, 104 Ill. App. 3d 436, 432 N.E.2d 1074
(1982) (and cases cited therein). But see People v. Rollins, 108 Ill. App. 3d 480, 438 N.E.2d 1322
(1982) (verdicts required on each offense charged).
47. See I.P.I. (Crim.) § 26.01 (2d ed. 1981), and Committee Note thereto. See also the refer-
ence to verdict forms at the conclusion of sample instruction § 27.01. Whether one "not guilty"
form or multiple "not guilty" forms should be used is an issue with significance beyond murder-
voluntary manslaughter cases. This article takes no position on the actions of the I.P.I. Committee
in seeking to modify Illinois practice.
48. See People v. Owens, 109 Ill. App. 3d 1150, 441 N.E.2d 908 (1982). See also supra notes
20-24 and accompanying text.
49. Id
50. See supra note 40 for reference to these four unreported decisions.
51. In People v. Taylor, 36 Ill. App. 3d 898, 344 N.E.2d 742 (1976), the trial judge had en-
tered a voluntary manslaughter judgment after the jury had found the defendant guilty of both
murder and voluntary manslaughter. This decision was not before the reviewing court. In a simi-
lar situation, the trial judge had entered a murder judgment in People v. Stuller, 71 Ill. App. 3d
118, 389 N.E.2d 593 (1979). The Stuller court on review allowed a judgment only for voluntary
manslaughter. Stuller is of dubious authority, however, because it is based upon the assumption
that to secure a murder verdict, the prosecution must prove the absence of passion-provocation
and imperfect justification when such mitigating circumstances are in issue. This proposition is
contrary to the present pattern instructions. See supra note 4. See also the discussion of Stuller in
the text which accompanies notes 127-59 infra.
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under those instructions the voluntary manslaughter finding establishes
every element of murder and is not inconsistent with a murder find-
ing.5 2 Ordinarily, punishment is imposed on the more serious charge
where a defendant has been convicted of two crimes arising from a
single act.5 3
Nevertheless, a decision to sentence for murder where the jury has
also found the accused guilty of voluntary manslaughter highlights the
most remarkable of all anomalies in the relationship between murder
and voluntary manslaughter. If the jury acquits the accused of murder,
it cannot logically convict him of voluntary manslaughter, because the
acquittal of murder necessarily implies the absence of proof as to at
least one element of voluntary manslaughter. 54 If the jury convicts him
of murder, a voluntary manslaughter conviction is surplusage.55 Ac-
cordingly, the logic which underlies the current Illinois instructions
makes it pointless for the court to instruct the jury as to voluntary man-
slaughter in any case where the court instructs the jury as to murder. If
juries obeyed the instructions now given in murder-voluntary man-
slaughter cases, courts would never have occasion in such cases to sen-
tence for voluntary manslaughter. Consequently, the manslaughter
instructions would be surplusage. This conclusion clearly demonstrates
a state of confusion in Illinois law in the typical case where a jury is
directed to consider both murder and voluntary manslaughter verdicts.
B. The Non-Jury Trial on a Charge of Murder
In a bench trial on a charge of murder, the judge need not articu-
late views as to what proof establishes murder and what proof estab-
lishes voluntary manslaughter. With no jury to instruct, he or she can
avoid addressing the subject of burdens. The burdens, nevertheless,
must be the same as in a jury trial.
If the trial court adhered to the principles underlying the pattern
instructions, it would decide whether the accused was guilty of murder
without considering the issue of passion-provocation or of imperfect
justification.56 Moreover, it would find the defendant guilty of volun-
tary manslaughter only if the prosecution proved every element of
murder plus the element of passion-provocation or of imperfect justifi-
52. See infra text accompanying note 127.
53. See People v. Jones, 93 IUl. App. 3d 475, 417 N.E.2d 647 (1981).
54. Compare § 7.02, supra note 4 with § 7.04 and § 7.06, supra note 5.
55. It is surplusage if, as the author concludes, conviction and sentence can be entered only
on the more serious charge of murder.
56. See § 7.02, supra note 4.
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cation.57 Thus, it would never find the accused guilty of voluntary man-
slaughter without also finding him guilty of murder. 58
Not surprisingly, however, there appears to be no reported deci-
sion in which a trial judge found the defendant guilty of both voluntary
manslaughter and murder on a single count of murder. Even if not
appealed, such a finding would be the subject of widespread commen-
tary among lawyers and judges. Yet no such finding has come to the
attention of the experienced lawyers and judges with whom the author
has conversed on the subject.
Something must be amiss if judges in bench trials do not adhere to
the principles of law which they set forth to guide the triers of fact in
jury trials. Like most juries, judges must adopt the common sense no-
tion that the crime is not murder if the killing was accompanied by
passion-provocation or imperfect justification. As in cases where juries
find the accused guilty of voluntary manslaughter and not guilty of
murder, a court's finding of voluntary manslaughter ordinarily gives no
hint as to how the trier of fact viewed the burden of proof: did it re-
quire the defense to prove the presence of mitigating circumstances to
reduce the offense to manslaughter, or did it require the prosecution to
disprove the presence of mitigating circumstances to establish murder?
Nor does such a finding reflect the quantum of that burden, whether a
preponderance, a clear preponderance, or beyond a reasonable doubt.
If a trial judge finds a murder defendant guilty of voluntary man-
slaughter without requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the
presence of passion-provocation or of imperfect justification, the judge
is inviting a "murder-or-nothing" argument on appeal. 59 There is a
tension fraught with the potential for reversal, if the reviewing court,
true to the I.P.I. homicide instructions, insists upon proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt of the statutory mitigating circumstances to sustain a
voluntary manslaughter conviction. In the next subsection, this article
discusses the manner in which reviewing courts react to "murder-or-
nothing" claims.60 It treats the lesson which that reaction illustrates
concerning the proper allocation of burdens in cases where both mur-
der and voluntary manslaughter are at issue.6'
57. See §§ 7.04, 7.06, supra note 5.
58. See supra text accompanying notes 20-24.
59. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. See also infra text accompanying notes 73-95.
60. See infra text accompanying notes 76-92.
61. Id
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C Voluntary Manslaughter as the Sole Charge
When the prosecution charges voluntary manslaughter, it must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt either passion-provocation or imper-
fect justification whenever the defendant has pleaded not guilty. 62 The
Supreme Court of Illinois requires such proof even as to elements
which the defendant does not strenuously contest. 63 The United States
Supreme Court also has declared that due process mandates such
proof.64 As long as the presence of passion-provocation or imperfect
justification is viewed as an element of voluntary manslaughter, the
prosecution cannot escape its burden of proving that element when it
chooses to charge voluntary manslaughter, unless the defense stipulates
to the presence of that element. Even if the evidence shows murder, the
jury must acquit the accused where the charge is voluntary manslaugh-
ter but the evidence does not establish passion-provocation or imper-
fect justification. 65 Furthermore, double jeopardy principles prohibit
the prosecution from charging murder after the defendant has been
tried for voluntary manslaughter. 66
Accordingly, experienced prosecutors rarely charge voluntary
manslaughter even when they believe that the statutory mitigating cir-
cumstances were present.6 7 Prosecutors do not wish to be in a position
where they charge voluntary manslaughter and then suffer an acquittal
62. See People v. Bailey, 56 Ill. App. 2d 261, 205 N.E.2d 756 (1965), discussed in text accom-
panying note 110 infra.
63. See People v. Rogers, 415 I11. 343, 114 N.E.2d 398 (1953); People v. Scheck, 356 Ill. 56,
190 N.E. 108 (1934).
64. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
65. This principle is stated in Bailey, supra note 62 and in the "murder-or-nothing" decision
cited supra note 16.
66. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977), holds that, absent a defense waiver, the accused
cannot be tried separately for the "included" offense and the "including" offense. Even if volun-
tary manslaughter is not truly included in murder, see supra text accompanying notes 10-19, ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 3-3 (1981) would prohibit successive trials arising from the same homicide.
67. The reviewing court opinions reveal very few instances in which voluntary manslaughter
was the sole charge. In People v. Bailey, 56 Ill. App. 2d 261, 205 N.E.2d 756 (1965), discussed in
text accompanying note 110 infra, while charging voluntary manslaughter and involuntary man-
slaughter, the prosecutor created difficulties for himself by not charging murder. In a few other
cases prosecutors have charged both murder and voluntary manslaughter. See, e.g., People v.
Ellis, 107 Ill. App. 3d 120, 437 N.E.2d 409 (1982); People v. Millet, 60 Ill. App. 2d 22, 208 N.E.2d
670 (1965); People v. Jones, 131 Il. App. 2d 647, 264 N.E.2d 299 (1970); People v. Barnett, 125 Ill.
App. 2d 70, 260 N.E.2d 303 (1970); People v. Gajda, 87 II. App. 2d 316, 232 N.E.2d 49 (1967).
Under Illinois pleading rules, when murder alone is charged, the trier of fact can consider volun-
tary manslaughter if the evidence would support such a finding. See supra note 19 and accompa-
nying text. Thus the additional charge of voluntary manslaughter is superfluous. A prosecutor
who, nevertheless, charges both murder and voluntary manslaughter seems to be saying "I think
there were mitigating circumstances, but I refuse to get into the murder-or-nothing trap by charg-
ing only voluntary manslaughter."
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where the court or jury believes that the evidence shows an unjustified
intentional homicide not accompanied by mitigating circumstances.
The problem is that sometimes prosecutors should charge volun-
tary manslaughter rather than murder. If the difference between the
two crimes is the presence of mitigating circumstances, there are situa-
tions in which it is clear from the outset that the defendant was so seri-
ously provoked that the appropriate verdict would be voluntary
manslaughter. 68 A charge of murder under such circumstances has ad-
verse consequences besides the inherent unfairness in charging murder
where the authorities themselves concede that the offense is less serious.
Overcharging may cause the accused to be incarcerated before trial
when the proper charge of voluntary manslaughter would permit his or
her release on bond or recognizance. 69 Moreover, if the accused is
charged with voluntary manslaughter and convicted of that crime de-
spite the absence of much evidence of passion-provocation or imperfect
justification, a reviewing court, as discussed in the next subsection,
straining to affirm, may seriously dilute the concept of passion-provo-
cation or imperfect justification, lest it be required to set a murderer
free. 70
The challenge is to devise a system which permits the prosecution
to charge voluntary manslaughter without risking an acquittal if it
proves an intentional unjustified homicide but does not establish be-
yond a reasonable doubt the presence of mitigating circumstances. The
proposal presented below would do this while forever ridding Illinois
law of "murder-or-nothing" claims.7'
D. Review of Voluntary Manslaughter Convictions and of Murder
Convictions
1. Review of Voluntary Manslaughter Convictions
When the court or jury finds the accused guilty of voluntary man-
slaughter, without also finding him guilty of murder, according to Illi-
68. The author has in mind, for example, the parent who, immediately upon learning of a
violent attack upon his or her child, goes to the police station and shoots the suspect who is in
custody. Illinois juries have been known to reduce murder charges to manslaughter in the absence
of either instructions or a formal verdict form for that offense. See People v. Garippo, 321 Ill. 157,
151 N.E. 584 (1926).
69. Most homicides which seem to be accompanied by passion-provocation or imperfect self-
defense, probably, under any view of the evidence, would not qualify as capital under ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1 (1981). Accordingly, the court must set bond in some amount. People ex rel.
Hemingway v. Elrod, 60 Ill. 2d 74, 322 N.E.2d 837 (1975). However, the bond in a non-capital
murder case will typically be higher than the bond in a manslaughter case.
70. See infra text accompanying notes 78-82.
71. See infra text accompanying notes 103-04 and 168-73.
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nois decisions, it has acquitted him of murder.72  Thereafter, the
accused may argue that the offense was "murder-or-nothing," so that,
already acquitted of murder, he must go free because the evidence does
not support a voluntary manslaughter conviction. 73
Frequently, this argument will merely renew a claim that the de-
fendant made earlier when he objected to the trial court's instructing
the jury concerning voluntary manslaughter. The accused's claim that
the evidence does not support a voluntary manslaughter verdict is the
equivalent of an argument that the jury should not have been in-
structed on that subject.
If passion-provocation or imperfect justification is an element of
voluntary manslaughter, then the trial court should not instruct con-
cerning that offense unless the evidence could support a determination,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that such mitigating circumstances accom-
panied the homicide. However, the reviewing court opinions do not
make this point. On the contrary, they seem to suggest that "some evi-
dence" of such circumstances will justify voluntary manslaughter in-
structions and will suffice to uphold a voluntary manslaughter
conviction. 74 The reviewing court approach seems inappropriate if the
prosecution must prove the presence of mitigating circumstances be-
yond a reasonable doubt in order to obtain a manslaughter verdict.
The "some evidence" standard for instructing on voluntary manslaugh-
ter would make more sense if the crime were deemed voluntary man-
slaughter unless the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt the
absence of such circumstances.75
Reviewing courts have a natural aversion to the "murder-or-noth-
ing" argument, even when the defendant is merely renewing a claim
which he made prior to the voluntary manslaughter finding.76 When
72. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
73. For examples of such arguments, see the case cited in note 25 supra.
74. See People v. Purrazzo, 95 I11. App. 3d 886, 420 N.E.2d 461 (1981) ("some evidence" test);
People v. Strong, 79 Ill. App. 3d 17, 398 N.E.2d 216 (1979) ("very slight" evidence upon defense
theory justifies an instruction). See also People v. Hammock, 68 I11. App. 3d 34, 385 N.E.2d 796
(1979); People v. Odum, 3 111. App. 3d 538, 279 N.E.2d 12 (1972).
75. This, of course, is what the article proposes in Section IV, infra.
76. See the cases cited in note 81 infra in which such claims were rejected. Opinions written
by two extraordinarily able appellate judges illustrate the substantial nature of the aversion. To
avoid reversing on "murder-or-nothing" grounds, Justice Edward Egan wrote that a voluntary
manslaughter conviction could be sustained even without proof of one of the elements of volun-
tary manslaughter. See People v. Young, I I Ill. App. 3d 609, 297 N.E.2d 298 (1973), discussed in
text accompanying note 121 infra. Justice Daniel McNamara invoked an estoppel principle to
uphold a voluntary manslaughter conviction without regard to whether one of the elements of
voluntary manslaughter had been established. See People v. Curwick, 33 Ill. App. 3d 757, 338
N.E.2d 468 (1975), infra note 83.
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the evidence of passion-provocation or imperfect justification is slight
or non-existent, it is natural to conclude that the jury or the trial court
returned a voluntary manslaughter verdict out of sympathy to the ac-
cused or bias against the deceased. This is especially so in bench trials
where the court may have desired to avoid the high mandatory mini-
mum sentence for murder even though the statutory mitigating circum-
stances were absent.77 Under these circumstances, when it would have
sustained a murder conviction, the reviewing court is most reluctant to
allow the defendant to go free for want of proof of mitigating
circumstances.
Thus, appellate panels stretch the statutory mitigating circum-
stances to uphold voluntary manslaughter convictions where proof of
passion-provocation or of imperfect justification is very weak. Several
decisions, for example, ignore the proposition, expressed elsewhere in
Illinois opinions, that the crime is not voluntary manslaughter if the
accused's reaction was grossly disproportionate to the provocation. 78
One court held that a reasonable jury could have found passion-provo-
cation sufficient to reduce murder to manslaughter when the provoca-
tion was the bending of an automobile antenna. 79 Other cases dilute
the proposition that "mere words" do not constitute sufficient
provocation. 80
Such decisions, by loosening the standard for judicially cognizable
provocation, adversely affect the law. In other cases where the prosecu-
tion argues that the evidence would not justify a voluntary manslaugh-
ter instruction, defense counsel can urge upon the court the diluted
standard of provocation found in opinions which reject the "murder-
77. The mandatory minimum penalty for murder is twenty years. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§§ 9-1, 1005-8-1 (1981). The mandatory minimum penalty for voluntary manslaughter recently
was raised from three years to four years. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 9-2, 1005-8-1 (1981). The
names of trial judges whose findings of voluntary manslaughter have been followed by defense
claims of "murder-or-nothing" read like a partial "Who's Who" of jurists known for compassion
and a desire to avoid sentences which appear to them to be unnecessarily harsh: the Hon. Warren
Wolfson in People v. Smith, 58 Il. App. 3d 784, 374 N.E.2d 1285 (1978); the Hon. Kenneth Wendt
in People v. Beathea, 24 Ill. App. 3d 460, 321 N.E.2d 458 (1974); the Hon. Daniel Ryan in People
v. Thompson, 11 Ill. App. 3d 752, 297 N.E.2d 592 (1973); the Hon. Louis Garippo in People v.
Smith, 16 Ill. App. 3d 553, 306 N.E.2d 606 (1973), People v. Dodson, 11 Ill. App. 3d 709, 297
N.E.2d 367 (1973), and People v. Stowers, 133 Ill. App. 2d 627, 273 N.E.2d 493 (1971); the Hon.
Kenneth Wilson in People v. Young, I 1 Ill. App. 3d 609, 297 N.E.2d 298 (1973).
78. Cases which uphold murder convictions and exemplify the requirement of proportional-
ity include People v. Dowdell, 84 Ill. App. 3d 707, 406 N.E.2d 123 (1980), and People v. Matthews,
21 Ill. App. 3d 249, 314 N.E.2d 15 (1974).
79. See People v. Tucker, 3 Ill. App. 3d 152, 278 N.E.2d 516 (1971).
80. See, e.g., People v. Pierce, 52 Ill. 2d 7, 284 N.E.2d 279 (1972); People v. Newberry, 127 I11.
App. 2d 322, 262 N.E.2d 282 (1970); People v. Stepheny, 76 Ill. App. 2d 131, 221 N.E.2d 798
(1966).
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or-nothing" claim. Of course, Illinois reviewing courts can maintain
two distinct lines of cases concerning the quantum of evidence which
creates an issue for the trier of fact regarding whether the offense is
voluntary manslaughter. They can invoke a strict standard of mitigat-
ing circumstances when the prosecution is trying to uphold a murder
verdict after the trial judge has refused a voluntary manslaughter in-
struction. They can use a loose standard of mitigating circumstances
when the defendant uses "murder-or-nothing" reasoning to attack a
voluntary manslaughter finding. The cases suggest exactly such a
double standard.8' The challenge, as discussed below, is to find an ap-
proach which makes this intellectual dishonesty unnecessary.
8 2
It is even more difficult for a defendant to prevail with a "murder-
or-nothing" argument when he had sought or acquiesced in considera-
tion of a voluntary manslaughter finding at the trial court level. The
murder defendant may have urged the trial judge to instruct the jury
concerning voluntary manslaughter or may have failed to object to
such instructions. In a bench trial, defense counsel, faced with a mur-
der charge, may have argued that, at most, the evidence would support
a finding of voluntary manslaughter. After an acquittal of murder and
a conviction of voluntary manslaughter, can such a defendant success-
fully argue that the crime was "murder-or-nothing"?
One decision suggests that the accused is estopped under such cir-
cumstances.83 Other courts perhaps have been reluctant to assert that,
where the plea was not guilty, the accused can be estopped from argu-
ing that the evidence did not establish the elements of the offense of
81. Among the decisions which uphold voluntary manslaughter convictions by stretching the
concept of passion-provocation are People v. Jones, 384 I11. 407, 51 N.E.2d 543 (1943) (victim seen
in tavern with another woman); People v. Binion, 132 Ill. App. 2d 257, 267 N.E.2d 715 (1971)
(victim threw pursue, hitting defendant, and used bad language); People v. Hough, 102 Ill. App.
2d 287, 243 N.E.2d 520 (1968) (lone black victim allegedly fought caucasian youth with radio
antenna, beaten to death in Cicero by four caucasian youths using baseball bat). See also the
Tucker case, discussed in text accompanying note 79 supra.
Many decisions uphold murder convictions where the trial judge refused to instruct concern-
ing voluntary manslaughter although the provocation was as great as or greater than the provoca-
tion in the previously cited cases where the courts found sufficient evidence of provocation to
reject "murder-or-nothing" claims. See, e.g., People v. Handley, 51 I11. 2d 229, 282 N.E.2d 131,
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 914 (1972) (facts were similar to Hough, but the court held that any provoca-
tion was insignificant because victim was greatly outnumbered). See also People v. Toth, 106 I11.
App. 3d 27, 435 N.E.2d 748 (1982) (victim hit defendant with paint brush, pulled serrated steak
knife, cut defendant on arm; court held evidence insufficient to warrant voluntary manslaughter
instruction).
82. See infra text accompanying notes 103-04.
83. People v. Curwick, 33 Ill. App. 3d 757, 338 N.E.2d 468 (1975), upheld a voluntary man-
slaughter verdict without denying the appellant's assertion that there had been no evidence of
adequate provocation to make the crime voluntary manslaughter. The court merely stated that
the appellant had sought and obtained a voluntary manslaughter instruction.
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which he was convicted. At any rate, without declaring the accused
estopped, most courts simply stretch the concept of passion-provoca-
tion or imperfect justification as far as is necessary to defeat a "murder-
or-nothing" claim.84
Under present law, such claims may also be made in a third situa-
tion-where the original charge was voluntary manslaughter rather
than murder and the court or jury found the accused guilty of volun-
tary manslaughter. The defendant then argues that while the evidence
could have supported a murder conviction, it cannot support a volun-
tary manslaughter conviction for want of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of either passion-provocation or of imperfect justification. Such
arguments have occasionally succeeded.8 5 They rarely arise, however,
because prosecutors rarely charge voluntary manslaughter, lest they
face the possibility of just such a "murder-or-nothing" claim. 86 As in-
dicated below, there is a scheme which would permit the prosecution to
charge voluntary manslaughter when fairness dictates, without losing
the possibility of obtaining either a murder or a voluntary manslaugh-
ter conviction, if its evidence shows an intentional or knowing unjusti-
fied homicide but does not establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, the
presence of mitigating circumstances. 87
On those few occasions when a defendant prevails with a claim
that while the evidence would support a murder conviction, it will not
support a voluntary manslaughter conviction, he usually had been
charged with murder. 88 This infrequent result has occurred after a jury
trial in which the defendant objected to a voluntary manslaughter in-
struction or after a bench trial in which the defense did not urge the
court to consider a voluntary manslaughter finding.8 9 Ironically, the
more that the trial judge or the jury stretches the concept of mitigating
circumstances to benefit the accused and avoid a murder conviction,
the more likely is it that the accused, acquitted at trial of murder, will
win reversal of the voluntary manslaughter conviction.90 Perhaps it is
84. Some of the cases cited in note 81 supra are of this type.
85. See People v. Bailey, 56 Ill. App. 2d 261, 205 N.E.2d 756 (1965).
86. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 62-67.
88. See the decisions cited in the first paragraph of note 25 supra.
89. Id Under Illinois law, ajudge is allowed but not required to give a voluntary manslaugh-
ter instruction sua sponte if the evidence warrants such an instruction. See, e.g., People v. Taylor,
36 Ill. 2d 483, 224 N.E.2d 266 (1967); People v. Lewis, 51 11. App. 3d 109, 366 N.E.2d 446 (1977);
People v. Hall, 25 IlL. App. 3d 992, 324 N.E.2d 50 (1975); People v. Hough, 102 Il1. App. 2d 287,
243 N.E.2d 520 (1968).
90. Former Judge Louis Garippo has related to the author the story of a defendant whom
Garippo very properly could have found guilty of murder in a case where the evidence revealed
an unjustified, intentional homicide, accompanied by little evidence of passion-provocation or
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for this reason that some outstanding appellate judges have shown such
antipathy for the "murder-or-nothing" claim. 9' It is also for this reason
that the article suggests below an approach which would prevent "mur-
der-or-nothing" claims from arising.92
Currently, when courts feel compelled to accept the argument that
a voluntary manslaughter conviction must be reversed for want of
proof of mitigating circumstances, some salvage a lesser conviction for
the prosecution. These courts reduce the voluntary manslaughter judg-
ment to an involuntary manslaughter judgment.93 Such a result can be
justified if involuntary manslaughter is viewed as included within the
offense charged (usually murder) and also within the offense of which
the accused was convicted (voluntary manslaughter).94 Because of the
relatively light punishment for involuntary manslaughter, as compared
to that for murder and voluntary manslaughter,95 this approach is not
as satisfactory as the one proposed below.
2. Review of Murder Convictions
Appellate review of murder convictions can also generate issues
concerning allocation of burdens in murder-voluntary manslaughter
cases. This article previously discussed the analytical problems arising
from the occasional reduction of a murder conviction to a voluntary
manslaughter conviction in a system where the offense of murder in-
cludes no element which is not also an element of voluntary man-
slaughter.96 The article also discussed use of the "some evidence" test
to determine whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct con-
cerning voluntary manslaughter, a standard that seems inconsistent
imperfect justification. After giving the defendant the break of a lifetime by finding him guilty of
voluntary manslaughter, Garippo listened as the defendant asked him, "Judge, shouldn't it have
been murder or nothing?"
91. See supra note 76.
92. See infra text accompanying notes 103-04.
93. See People v. Towers, 17 Ill. App. 3d 467, 308 N.E.2d 223 (1974); People v. Dodson, 11
Ill. App. 3d 709, 297 N.E.2d 367 (1973); People v. Bailey, 56 Ill. App. 2d 261, 205 N.E.2d 756
(1965) (reducing offense to involuntary manslaughter). The other decisions cited herein which
accept "murder-or-nothing" claims (see supra note 16 and infra note 108) merely vacate the mur-
der conviction and acquit the defendant.
94. Involuntary manslaughter is an unjustified homicide performed recklessly. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 9-3 (1981). Because involuntary manslaughter requires no proof of any conduct,
circumstances, or result not also required for murder or for voluntary manslaughter, and because
recklessness is a less culpable mental state than is required for murder or for voluntary man-
slaughter (see supra note 20), involuntary manslaughter appears to be included within both mur-
der and voluntary manslaughter. See the statutory definition of "included," supra note 10.
95. The ordinary range for murder is twenty to forty years, and for voluntary manslaughter it
is four to twenty years. See supra note 77. For involuntary manslaughter, the ordinary range is
two to five years. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 9-3 and 1005-8-1 (1981).
96. See supra text accompanying notes 25-28.
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with the proposition that voluntary manslaughter requires proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt of either passion-provocation or imperfect
justification.97
Appellate review of murder convictions most directly poses the is-
sue of allocation of burdens when a defendant who has been convicted
of murder argues that the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury
that, to obtain a murder conviction, the prosecution must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt the absence of mitigating circumstances. 98 Such an
argument is a direct challenge to the present Illinois Pattern Jury In-
structions.99 It, in effect, urges that voluntary manslaughter be treated
as a partial affirmative defense to murder.
In the next section, this article explains the nature and the virtue of
the affirmative defense approach. It does so in the context of a discus-
sion of a proposed statute implementing the approach. The following
section, however, after treating those Illinois decisions which discuss
burdens of proof in murder-voluntary manslaughter cases, argues that
the judiciary can and should adopt the affirmative defense approach
even if the language of the present statutes remains unchanged.
IV. LEGISLATING AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE APPROACH
The source of most problems and uncertainties discussed in this
article is that by defining voluntary manslaughter as including, as an
element, passion-provocation or imperfect justification, the legislature
seemingly has cast upon the prosecution the burden of proving the
presence of that element in order to sustain a voluntary manslaughter
conviction. to0 At the same time, by defining murder without any refer-
ence to passion-provocation or imperfect justification, the legislature
has seemingly made the presence or absence of such mitigating circum-
stances irrelevant to a charge of murder.101
There are two means of rectifying the situation. One would define
murder as an unjustified knowing or intentional homicide performed in
the absence of circumstances heretofore indicated by the shorthand
phrases "passion-provocation" and "imperfect justification." Volun-
tary manslaughter would be defined simply as the unjustified knowing
or intentional homicide. The problem with this approach is that, under
97. See supra text accompanying notes 73-75.
98. Section V of this article treats several cases in which the appellant made such an
argument.
99. See supra notes 4 and 5.
100. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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Illinois law, if not under the United States Constitution, the prosecu-
tion would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of
these mitigating circumstances in order to sustain a murder conviction,
even if the defendant came forward with no evidence of mitigating cir-
cumstances. 102 The law should not require the prosecution to prove a
negative in the absence of some evidence supporting a specific claim of
mitigating circumstances.
Under an affirmative defense approach, voluntary manslaughter
would not be in issue until the defense came forward with a certain
quantum of evidence of the statutory mitigating circumstances. This
quantum might be "some evidence" or enough evidence to raise a rea-
sonable doubt about the absence of such circumstances, depending
upon which line of Illinois affirmative defense cases is followed. 10 3
Once the defense came forward with the required quantum of evi-
dence of either passion-provocation or of imperfect justification, ac-
cording to the fairly atypical allocation of burdens of persuasion under
the Illinois definition of "affirmative defense," the prosecution would
be required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of the
statutory mitigating circumstances. 104 If it failed to do so, but proved
the other elements of murder, namely an unjustified knowing or inten-
tional killing, it would be entitled to a voluntary manslaughter finding.
This article sets forth, in an appendix, a proposed statute and cor-
responding proposed instructions designed to implement the affirma-
102. It appears that under Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 702-03 nn.31-32 (1975), the
command of due process does not prohibit a state from requiring the defense to come forward
with some evidence of mitigating circumstances before shifting the burden to the prosecution of
proving the absence of such circumstances, even if the state defines the absence of such circum-
stances as an element of the offense. Under the Illinois Supreme Court decisions cited in note 63
supra, however, once something is defined as an element of the offense, the prosecution must
establish its presence without regard to whether the accused offers evidence of its absence. But
compare People v. Wilson, 131 IUl. App. 2d 731, 264 N.E.2d 492 (1970) (prosecution need show
male was above age fourteen for rape only if there is evidence that he was not); People v. Brown,
1111. App. 3d 67, 296 N.E.2d 77 (1973) (prosecution need only prove homicide was "unjustified"
if there is some evidence of justification). These latter cases may simply stand for the proposition
that, despite reference to them in the statute defining the crime, the age of the offender in a rape
case and the justified or unjustified nature of a killing in a murder case are to be treated as affirm-
ative defenses.
103. There is a split of authority in Illinois as to how much evidence the defense must intro-
duce to shift the burden to the prosecution to negate an affirmative defense. The quantum seems
to vary with the type of affirmative defense. See I.P.I. (Crim.) Introduction to 24-25.00, at 547-48
(2d ed. 1981). The I.P.I. drafters took the position that it was not their job to determine when an
affirmative defense instruction is required but only to draft such instructions for use when appro-
priate. This article adopts the same position.
104. A majority of recently revised penal codes place the burden of proving an affirmative
defense upon the accused. See generally Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of
Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1327, 1354-55 (1979).
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tive defense approach to voluntary manslaughter. The approach has
several advantages:
1. The affirmative defense approach would end the anomaly of
requiring the prosecution to prove the presence of mitigating circum-
stances to sustain a voluntary manslaughter conviction when the origi-
nal charge was murder and when at the trial the prosecution sought to
disprove the presence of mitigating circumstances.
2. It would make relevant to a determination of whether murder
has been established the presence or absence of those mitigating cir-
cumstances which traditionally have been thought to reduce murder to
manslaughter.
3. It would not require the prosecution in a murder case to prove
a negative (the absence of mitigating circumstances) until enough evi-
dence was presented to raise an issue as to whether the crime was vol-
untary manslaughter.
4. It would clearly allocate burdens of coming forward and bur-
dens of proof in murder-voluntary manslaughter cases. 0 5
5. It would guide the trier of fact to avoid multiple verdicts of
both murder and voluntary manslaughter.
6. When murder is the charge, it would end claims of "murder-
or-nothing" and the stretching of the concept of passion-provocation to
meet such arguments. There never would be a situation where the ac-
cused could argue that, although the evidence established murder, a
verdict of voluntary manslaughter could not stand. In a murder trial, a
voluntary manslaughter conviction could result from successful use of
an affirmative defense without proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the
presence of passion-provocation or of imperfect justification. 0 6
7. The affirmative defense approach would make consistent the
meaning of "included offense." Voluntary manslaughter truly would
be included in murder. In a murder-voluntary manslaughter prosecu-
tion, proof of murder would necessarily establish every element of vol-
untary manslaughter. This is because the mitigating circumstances
would not be an element of voluntary manslaughter, but rather, would
constitute an affirmative defense to murder.10 7
105. But, as recognized in note 103 supra and accompanying text, Illinois courts would be left
to decide how much evidence of mitigating circumstances would suffice to put voluntary man-
slaughter in issue and to shift the burden of proof to the prosecution.
106. See infra text accompanying note 123 for a further explanation of this statement.
107. See infra text accompanying notes 121-23. The statute as drafted would have another
advantage which is not directly related to the problems discussed in this article. It would spell out
the mental state requirement for voluntary manslaughter (acting knowingly or intentionally) in
the same terms used in the murder statute. See supra note 20.
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V. JUSTIFICATION FOR JUDICIAL ADOPTION OF THE AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSE APPROACH
A. Actions of the Pattern Instructions Committee in Light of Illinois
Appellate Court Decisions
In the absence of a statutory amendment, the issue remains
whether the judiciary can and should treat passion-provocation and
imperfect justification as a partial affirmative defense which would re-
duce a charge of murder to the lesser offense of voluntary manslaugh-
ter. A distinct question is whether the drafters of the pattern
instructions can properly adopt that approach without departing from
principles embodied in the present Illinois case law. Both questions
require some examination of Illinois decisions which have expressly
discussed burden of proof issues in murder-voluntary manslaughter
cases and consideration of the actions of the pattern instructions
committee.
Before adoption of the 1961 Code of Criminal Law, the Illinois
decisions interpreting the former statute reflected some of the same
anomalies and contradictions as exist under current law. 0 8 A few deci-
108. Murder was the "unlawful killing of a human being, in peace of the people, with malice
aforethought, either express or implied." The murder statute specified that malice "shall be im-
plied when no considerable provocation appears .. " ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 358 (1959). The
manslaughter statute read, in part: "Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being with-
out malice, express or implied, and without any mixture of deliberation whatever. It must be
voluntary, upon a sudden heat of passion, caused by a provocation apparently sufficient to make
the passion irresistible. ... ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 361 (1959).
It is an oversimplification to state, however, that to obtain a murder conviction the prosecu-
tion had the burden of proving malice, that is, the absence of provocation. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 373 (1959), stated:
The killing being proved, the burden of proving circumstances of mitigation, or that
justify or excuse the homicide will devolve on the accused, unless the proof on the part of
the prosecution sufficiently manifests that the crime committed only amounts to man-
slaughter, or that the accused was justified or excused in committing the homicide.
Thus, a reading of the statutes suggests that the burden of proving provocation to reduce murder
to manslaughter was on the defendant. The matter was clouded, however, by decisions which
prohibited trial judges from instructing the jury as to the burden by quoting the statutory language
setting forth the presumption. See, e.g., People v. Sterankovich, 313 Ill. 556, 145 N.E. 172 (1924);
People v. Durand, 307 Ill. 611, 139 N.E. 70 (1923). See also infra text accompanying note 109.
A return to the old law would be unsatisfactory for several reasons:
(1) If the statute, as it appears, defined murder as including as an element the absence
of provocation, and then shifted to the defendant the burden of proving the presence of provoca-
tion, the shift of burden would violate due process under Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
(2) If the statute did not control as to the allocation of burdens, it would be impossible
to determine from the Illinois case law where the burdens were under pre-1962 Illinois law and
what a trial judge was supposed to tell a jury about those burdens in murder and manslaughter
cases.
(3) Despite judicial proclamations to the contrary, under former law voluntary man-
slaughter was not truly included in murder any more than it is today. Long before 1962, Illinois
courts agreed that in some cases evidence which was satisfactory to establish murder could be
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
sions mentioned the allocation of burdens and suggested that when
there was a doubt whether the evidence showed murder or manslaugh-
ter, the doubt should be resolved in favor of a manslaughter verdict.109
Such decisions can be read as support for the requirement that the
prosecution negate beyond a reasonable doubt the presence of mitigat-
ing circumstances in order to obtain a murder verdict.
Reviewing court discussion of burdens under the 1961 Code has
been confined exclusively to Illinois Appellate Court opinions. In
1965, in People v. Bailey, 10 the defendant had been charged with vol-
untary manslaughter rather than murder. The court struck down the
voluntary manslaughter conviction after it found that the prosecution
had failed to prove the presence of passion-provocation or imperfect
justification. Writing for the court, Justice McCormick stated that plac-
ing the burden on the prosecution to prove the presence of mitigating
circumstances lacked logic, but he added that the legislature had done
so in cases where the prosecutor brought a charge of voluntary man-
slaughter. The Bailey opinion vaguely implies that where the original
charge is murder, the allocation of burdens is different and more logi-
cal." l I Carefully read, Bailey is consistent with the proposition that
where the charge is murder, the prosecution must try to establish the
absence of mitigating circumstances to obtain a murder verdict and the
defense must try to establish the presence of mitigating circumstances
to obtain a manslaughter verdict. Justice McCormick did not indicate
which side he believed would bear the burden of proof nor what quan-
tum that burden would be when the original charge was murder.
Next came the first edition of the pattern instructions. The defini-
inadequate to prove voluntary manslaughter for want of proof of a requisite element of voluntary
manslaughter, namely adequate provocation.
See, e.g., People v. Newman, 360 Ill. 226, 195 N.E. 645 (1935) (murder defendant found guilty of
manslaughter, then freed when reviewing court held that the proof showed a "cooling" and the
absence of passion-provocation at the time of the killing). See also People v. Smith, 404 I11. 350,
88 N.E. 834 (1949); People v. Marsh, 403 111. 81, 85 N.E.2d 715 (dictum), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 837
(1949); People v. Jones, 384 Ill. 407, 51 N.E.2d 543 (1943) (dictum). As they do today, see supra
note 81 and accompanying text, Illinois courts upheld manslaughter verdicts, rejecting "murder-
or-nothing" claims, by stretching the concept of passion-provocation. See, e.g., People v. Jones,
384 IUI. 407, 51 N.E.2d 543 (1943) (defendant "provoked" by seeing victim in tavern with another
woman). One case rejected the "murder-or-nothing" argument in an unusual situation. In Bar-
nett v. People, 54 Ill. 325 (1870), the accused had been acquitted of murder but convicted of
manslaughter. After a reversal for error, the accused was again convicted of manslaughter. He
argued that the evidence showed malice (including the absence of passion-provocation), so that
the manslaughter verdict could not Stand. The court said that under these limited circumstances a
manslaughter verdict could be upheld even if the evidence demonstrated the presence of malice.
109. See, e.g., People v. Jones, 313 I11. 335, 145 N.E. 110 (1924).
110. 56 I11. App. 2d 261, 205 N.E.2d 756 (1965).
111. Id at 275-76, 205 N.E.2d at 764.
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tional and the issues instructions in the homicide chapter merely
tracked the statute. "1 2 These instructions thus made it wholly irrelevant
to the charge of murder whether mitigating circumstances were present.
They required prosecution proof beyond a reasonable doubt of mitigat-
ing circumstances to obtain a voluntary manslaughter conviction.' 13
The drafters, however, also prepared two sets of sample instruc-
tions based upon hypothetical cases. In one hypothetical, the facts
called for consideration of murder, self-defense, and voluntary man-
slaughter of the imperfect justification type.1 14 The Honorable Prentice
Marshall, who prepared these samples, apparently was dissatisfied with
use of the homicide chapter pattern instructions in a case where the
jury was to consider both murder and voluntary manslaughter. 15
Thus, without explanation or citation of authority, the sample instruc-
tions of the first edition placed upon the prosecution the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of imperfect justifica-
tion. 1 6 In other words, sample instruction 27.01 treats the statutory
mitigating circumstances as an affirmative defense to murder.
In one respect, however, sample instruction 27.01 departed from
an affirmative defense approach. Although it told the jurors that to
obtain a murder conviction, the prosecution must prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt the absence of imperfect justification, it also instructed
the jury that, to obtain a voluntary manslaughter conviction, the prose-
cution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the presence of imperfect
justification." 17 A true affirmative defense approach would allow a con-
112. I.P.I. (Crim.) §§ 7.01-7.06 (1st ed. 1970).
113. Except for inclusion of a mental state requirement for voluntary manslaughter (see supra
note 20), the issues instructions for murder and voluntary manslaughter were in substance identi-
cal to those of the second edition. See supra notes 4 and 5.
114. I.P.I. (Crim.) § 27.01 (1st ed. 1970).
115. Members of the commmittee which prepared the first edition have informed me that the
task of preparing the sample instructions fell entirely to Judge Marshall and that the rest of the
committee did not review the sample instructions.
116. In pertinent part, § 27.01 read:
To sustain the charge of murder, the State must prove the following propositions:
First: That the defendant performed the acts which caused the death of John Smith;
Second: That when the defendant did so, he intended to kill or do great bodily harm to John
Smith, or he knew that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to John
Smith; and
Third: That the defendant was not justified in using the force which he used; and
Fourth: That the defendant did not believe that circumstances existed which justified the use
of the force which he used.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant guilty of murder.
If, on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of these
propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant
not guilty.
117. In other words, in setting forth what was necessary for a voluntary manslaughter convic-
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viction of voluntary manslaughter whenever the jury found beyond a
reasonable doubt an unjustified intentional or knowing homicide
without finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, the absence of imperfect
justification." 8 More importantly, sample 27.01 left a large gap: if the
evidence as to imperfect justification was fairly evenly divided, under
27.01, the defendant was guilty of neither murder nor voluntary man-
slaughter, despite proof beyond a reasonable doubt of an unjustified
intentional or knowing homicide.119 By contrast, the affirmative de-
fense approach outlined in this article would be "partial," because the
prosecution's failure to prove the absence of mitigating circumstances
would reduce the grade of the homicide to voluntary manslaughter,
rather than dictating an acquittal.
The next development came in 1973, when the appellant in People
v. Bergeron ' 20 argued that the court erred in his murder prosecution by
failing to give the 27.01 issues instruction that required the prosecution
to negate imperfect justification in order to obtain a murder conviction.
The reviewing court, apparently not apprehending the argument, sim-
ply said that the jury was adequately instructed as to self-defense. The
appellant, of course, was addressing imperfect justification, which dis-
tinguishes voluntary manslaughter from murder, and was not speaking
of self-defense, which merits acquittal.
Later in 1973, the Illinois Appellate Court decided another case
which has significant bearing on the burden of proof issue, although it
does not discuss jury instructions. In People v. Young, 12' the appellant
argued "murder or nothing" following his bench trial conviction of vol-
untary manslaughter. Justice Edward Egan declared that the court
would not reverse a voluntary manslaughter conviction where the evi-
dence sustained a finding that the accused had committed an unjusti-
fied knowing or intentional homicide. Egan's opinion was different
from others that responded to "murder-or-nothing" claims: it did not,
as an additional requirement for affirmance of a voluntary manslaugh-
tion, I.P.I. (Crim.) § 27.01 (1st ed. 1970) conformed to the issues instruction of I.P.I. (Crim.) § 7.06
(1st ed. 1970). See supra note 5 for the text of the substantially similar § 7.06 of the second
edition.
118. See infra text accompanying note 123.
119. Under the first edition's § 27.01, a murder conviction required proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of the absence of imperfect justification. A voluntary manslaughter conviction required
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the presence of imperfect justification. A jury following these
instructions could not convict of either crime if the evidence did not meet the reasonable doubt
standard. Although no case has so held, the author believes that this deficiency in the first edi-
tion's § 27.01 is sufficient reason for a court to refuse to instruct in the language of I.P.I. (Crim.)
§ 27.01 (1st ed. 1970).
120. 10 I11. App. 3d 762, 295 N.E.2d 228 (1973).
121. 11 Ill. App. 3d 568, 297 N.E.2d 298 (1973).
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ter conviction, mandate proof or the element of imperfect justification
or passion-provocation. 22 In other words, where the charge was mur-
der, the Young opinion concluded that a voluntary manslaughter con-
viction could be sustained in the absence of proof of one of the
elements of voluntary manslaughter.
The Young opinion makes sense only if voluntary manslaughter is
viewed as a partial affirmative defense to murder, rather than as a
crime which has as an element the presence of passion-provocation or
imperfect self-defense. Once mitigating circumstances are in issue in a
murder prosecution, it is as if the elements of murder are: (1) an unjus-
tified knowing or intentional homicide (2) in the absence of passion or
provocation, while the elements of voluntary manslaughter are merely
an unjustified knowing or intentional homicide. 23 As long as the pros-
ecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt the unjustified knowing or
intentional homicide, it can sustain a voluntary manslaughter finding
without regard to what the evidence shows concerning passion-provo-
cation or imperfect justification. Unfortunately, later opinions rejected
Young and returned to the older approach, which treated the presence
of passion-provocation or imperfect justification as an element of vol-
untary manslaughter, even where the charge was murder. 24
In 1976, in a single footnote sentence of dictum in People v.
Diaz,t25 Justice Stamos noted the proposition in sample instruction
27.01 which requires the prosecution to negate imperfect justification in
order to obtain a murder conviction where imperfect justification is in
issue. - He called it a mystery proposition that had no basis in the mur-
der instruction found in the I.P.I. homicide chapter. Because the de-
fendant had not been found guilty of murder and was not complaining
about the failure to give sample 27.01, Stamos had no occasion to ana-
lyze whether the affirmative defense approach of 27.01 was more ap-
propriate than that embodied in the instructions of the homicide
chapter.
122. People v. Thompson, 1 111. App. 3d 752, 297 N.E.2d 592 (1973), noted this dissimilarity
between Young and other decisions rejecting "murder-or-nothing" claims.
123. One commentator has argued that the word "element" has no meaning other than "that
which the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt." See Allen, Structuring Jury Deci-
sionmaking in Criminal Cases. ,4 Unified Constitutional Approach to Evidentiary Devices, 94 HARV.
L. REV. 321, 342-45 (1980). Using this analysis, one can conclude that once the burden shifts to
the prosecutor to prove fact X (here the absence of passion-provocation or imperfect justification),
fact X has become an element of the offense.
124. See, e.g., People v. Thompson, 11 I11. App. 3d 752, 297 N.E.2d 592 (1973) and the other
post-1973 "murder-or-nothing" decisions cited supra note 16.
125. 38 111. App. 3d 447, 348 N.E.2d 199 (1976).
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Next came People v. Seaberry, 26 in which Justice Seidenfeld
stated unequivocally that where the issue is properly raised in a murder
trial, the burden is on the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant did not act in a heat of passion. He further stated that
this obligation only arises where the defense has introduced some evi-
dence of heat of passion in asserting the "voluntary manslaughter de-
fense." The Seaberry statement is the clearest treatment of voluntary
manslaughter as a partial affirmative defense to murder in any Illinois
case. It would fully support use of the first edition's 27.01 proposition
that requires the state to prove the absence of mitigating circumstances
in order to secure a murder conviction. At the same time, the Seaberry
statement was mere dictum, which cited no Illinois decision in support
of its affirmative defense treatment of voluntary manslaughter.
One year later, in People v. Stuller, 27 the appellate court expressly
endorsed the 27.01 affirmative defense approach. In Stuller, the de-
fendant was convicted of both murder and voluntary manslaughter.
The jury had been instructed in accordance with the I.P.I. homicide
chapter instructions. As indicated previously, a jury should return such
multiple verdicts whenever it finds beyond a reasonable doubt an un-
justified knowing and intentional homicide plus either passion-provo-
cation or imperfect justification. The appellate court nevertheless
vacated the murder conviction. Justice Kasserman's opinion for the
court said that the trial judge should have used sample instruction
27.01. He correctly noted that by requiring the prosecution to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of mitigating circumstances, the
instruction would avoid multiple verdicts. Stuller indicates that the
"manifest purpose of the murder instruction is to make the jury aware
of the distinction between murder and voluntary manslaughter," and it
explained that the homicide is not murder if accompanied by the miti-
gating circumstances specified in the voluntary manslaughter statute.
Stuller further stated that it is the duty of the court, even where the
defense tenders no such instruction, to utilize 27.01 where both murder
and manslaughter are in issue. Stuller did not mention Young,
Seaberry, or older Illinois decisions which would have supported the
affirmative defense approach to the murder-voluntary manslaughter is-
sue. Nor did it note People v. Diaz's accurate observation that 27.01
departed from the I.P.I. homicide chapter instructions.
126. 63 Ill. App. 3d 718, 380 N.E.2d 511 (1978).
127. 71 I. App. 3d 118, 389 N.E.2d 593 (1979).
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Then came People v. March, 128 a 1981 decision which confronted
the claim that the trial court erred in failing to use the affirmative de-
fense approach of 27.01 where both murder and voluntary manslaugh-
ter were in issue. Justice Craven's opinion for the court declared: "The
question this issue presents is whether the jury must be instructed that
the State has to negate the elements of voluntary manslaughter beyond
a reasonable doubt before it can convict this defendant of murder.' ' 29
Because the court remanded for a new trial on other grounds, Cra-
ven declared that the court should not discuss "these complex questions
of constitutional law and statutory interpretation."' 30 He noted that
Justices Green and Trapp disagreed, and thus declared the sentiment of
the majority: "The trial court is not required to instruct the jury that
the State must negate the elements of voluntary manslaughter beyond a
reasonable doubt before they could convict him of murder."' 3'
Justice Green's concurring opinion states his support for that con-
clusion. He acknowledged that the instructions of the homicide I.P.I.
chapter do not seem to be sensible.' 32 He explained that under these
instructions, the unjustified intentional or knowing homicide is murder,
even if the evidence shows, by a preponderance of evidence, the pres-
ence of mitigating circumstances specified in the voluntary manslaugh-
ter statute. He added that the affirmative defense approach advocated
by the appellant was logical, and noted that under that approach, vol-
untary manslaughter would be truly included in murder.
Green, however, said that he could find no support in Illinois law,
at least since the adoption of the 1961 Code, for use of the affirmative
defense approach. 33 Neither his opinion, nor the others in March,
cited either Stuller or Seaberry, which definitely do support the affirm-
ative defense approach. Moreover, none of the March opinions refer to
other post-1961 decisions previously treated in this article which are
consistent with such an approach.
Justice Trapp also concurred in March, agreeing that Illinois deci-
sions do not support use of the affirmative defense approach. 34 He
also emphasized that the homicide chapter decisions did not violate
128. 95 I11. App. 3d 46, 419 N.E.2d 1212 (1981).
129. Id at 55-56, 419 N.E.2d at 1219.
130. Id
131. Id
132. People v. March, 95 IL. App. 3d 46, 61-62, 419 N.E.2d 1212, 1223 (1981) (Green, J.,
concurring).
133. Id
134. People v. March, 95 Ill. App. 3d 46, 419 N.E.2d 1212, 1220-22 (1981) (Trapp, J.,
concurring).
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United States Supreme Court decisions because they did not require
the defense to prove the absence of an element of murder in order to
avoid a murder conviction. 35
March was the latest word when the drafters of the second edition
of the I.P.I. finalized their instructions. As with the first edition, the
sample instructions were the work of a single person and were not
presented for review by the full committee. 136 However, the committee
did approve, in advance, the modification of sample instruction 27.01
to delete the affirmative defense approach.' 37 The committee con-
cluded that it could not overrule an appellate court decision (March)
which apparently settled the issue. It was also aware of the accurate
observation that Justice Stamos had made in Diaz: 27.01 appears in-
consistent with the I.P.I. homicide chapter instructions. The committee
fully concurred with Justice Trapp's observation in March that rejec-
tion of the 27.01 approach would violate no constitutional principle.
As memory serves, the committee was not aware of Stuller or Seaberry
when it made its decision. 38
After adoption of the revised 27.01, People v. Perez 139 was the first
decision to discuss the allocation of burdens in murder-voluntary man-
slaughter cases. As had appellants Bergeron and March, appellant Pe-
rez argued that the jury should have been instructed that a murder
conviction required the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt the absence of imperfect justification. In affirming his murder
conviction, the Perez court mentioned neither March nor the revised
27.01, both of which would have supported its result.
Instead, the court concentrated on distinguishing Stuller, which
had approved the affirmative defense approach of the earlier version of
27.01. The Perez court said that Stuller applies only where the jury has
found the defendant guilty of both murder and voluntary manslaugh-
ter. It contended that by signing a guilty verdict as to murder and a not
guilty verdict as to voluntary manslaughter, the Perez jury had found
that imperfect justification had been absent.140 This is not so, however.
Under the I.P.I. murder instructions, as indicated previously, a murder
conviction requires no determination concerning imperfect justifica-
135. Id.
136. The Hon. Warren Wolfson assumed this responsibility.
137. The author's notes and his memory of committee meetings are the basis for the state-
ments made in this paragraph.
138. Id
139. 100 Ill. App. 3d 901, 427 N.E.2d 229 (1981).
140. Id at 908, 427 N.E.2d at 234.
ALLOCATION OF BURDENS
tion.141 A voluntary manslaughter acquittal indicates only that the jury
did not find that the prosecution had proved beyond a reasonable
doubt the presence of mitigation. 142 Thus, Perez did not answer the
appellant's claim that, where both murder and voluntary manslaughter
are in issue, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the
absence of mitigation in order to obtain a murder verdict.
Finally, in People v. Vega, 14 3 the appellate court again confronted
the claim that the trial judge had erred in refusing to adopt the affirma-
tive defense approach of the first edition's 27.01. The Vega court ob-
served that this sample instruction correctly stated the law when it
required the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the ab-
sence of imperfect justification in order to obtain a murder conviction
when voluntary manslaughter also was in issue. 144
The Vega opinion then changed directions. It observed that the
second edition's 27.01 did not require such proof. It also said that the
other I.P.I. instructions adequately stated the law as embodied in the
first edition's version of 27.01, citing Bergeron. The court concluded
that giving the first edition's version of 27.01 was unnecessary.1 45 The
Vega court's premise is simply wrong: no other I.P.I. instructions tell
the jury that a murder conviction requires proof of the absence of im-
perfect justification.
The Vega opinion then changed directions again. It said that
Stuller seemed to require reversal because of the trial court's failure to
require the prosecution to negate imperfect justification in order to ob-
tain a murder conviction. The court, however, ended by distinguishing
Stuller and following Perez. Even though the Vega jury, unlike the
Perez jury, had not signed a not guilty verdict as to voluntary man-
slaughter, the court found that the murder verdict implied that the jury
had found that imperfect justification had been absent. ' 46 As indicated
previously, however, a murder conviction under the current I.P.I. in-
structions requires no determination as to imperfect justification or pas-
sion-provocation.147 Under those same instructions, a jury's decision
not to sign a voluntary manslaughter guilty verdict at most signifies its
belief that the prosecution failed to prove the presence of mitigating
141. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
143. 107 Il. App. 3d 289, 292, 437 N.E.2d 919, 923 (1982).
144. Id
145. Id
146. Id
147. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. 148
In sum, the Vega court said that the affirmative defense approach
of the first edition's 27.01 was correct, it erroneously concluded that
such an approach was embodied in other I.P.I. instructions, and it erro-
neously contended that a murder conviction, in the absence of a volun-
tary manslaughter conviction, implies that the prosecution has proved
everything required by the affirmative defense approach of the first edi-
tion's 27.01. Vega did not cite March nor concur in the March view
that Illinois law has not embodied the affirmative defense approach
where murder and voluntary manslaughter are both in issue.
B. The Proposal's Conformity with Present Illinois Case Law
Earlier, this article demonstrated the wisdom of treating voluntary
manslaughter as a partial affirmative defense to murder.149 This is not
enough to justify an I.P.I. adoption of that approach. In shaping issue
instructions, the I.P.I. drafters must be true to the judiciary's interpreta-
tion of Illinois law.
As a recital of the decisions indicates, however, Illinois courts have
not clearly rejected the treatment of voluntary manslaughter as a par-
tial affirmative defense to murder. On the contrary, Seaberry5 o and
StullerI5' expressly approve such an approach. In refusing to reverse
for failure to give the first edition's version of 27.01, the courts in Ber-
geron, 152 Perez,153 and Vega' 54 did not conclude that it was erroneous
to require the prosecution to prove the absence of mitigating circum-
stances. Vega even stated that such a requirement reflected Illinois
law. Diaz'" did no more than comment that the first edition's version
of 27.01 was not true to the I.P.I. homicide chapter instructions.
Thus, People v. March 156 is the only decision to hold that where
murder and voluntary manslaughter are in issue, the prosecution need
not prove the absence of mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable
doubt. It may be irrelevant to the present discussion that the two jus-
tices who concurred in the March dictum based their conclusions upon
148. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
149. Section IV supra.
150. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. As this article went to print, Perez was fol-
lowed, in People v. McGee, 110 Ill. App. 3d 766, 443 N.E.2d 1057 (1983).
154. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 125.
156. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
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the erroneous assumption that no Illinois decision supported the affirm-
ative defense approach. It is highly relevant, however, that Seaberry
and Stuller do indicate that, in Illinois, voluntary manslaughter is a
partial affirmative defense to a charge of murder. Because of these de-
cisions, one must conclude that among the Illinois decisions which
have directly considered the burden of proof issue, March represents
the minority view.
The affirmative defense approach is also consistent with several of
the contradictory lines of decisions treated in Section II of this article.
As noted by Justice Green in March, Illinois cases which declare that
voluntary manslaughter is included within murder are logical only if
the affirmative defense approach is utilized. 157 Additionally, as previ-
ously noted, if reviewing courts have the power to reduce a murder
conviction to voluntary manslaughter, the latter must be viewed as a
partial affirmative defense to murder. 58 If the power to reduce exists,
when murder is charged, voluntary manslaughter cannot be treated as
a separate crime with either passion-provocation or imperfect justifica-
tion as an element which must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. 59
C. The Judiciary's Freedom to Adopt the
Affirmative Defense Approach
If the I.P.I. drafters were to adopt the approach suggested in this
article, or if a trial judge were to use the instructions suggested in this
appendix, the judiciary would pass judgment upon the correctness of
the affirmative defense treatment of voluntary manslaughter. If a re-
viewing court were to agree that the affirmative defense approach was
sensible, as even Judge Green in March concluded, it will still have to
determine whether such an approach was consistent with legislative in-
tent. (See Addendum, page 62 of this article.)
The key objection is that the legislature has defined voluntary
manslaughter as a separate crime having as one of its elements passion-
provocation or imperfect justification. Under the suggested approach,
the accused, when charged with murder, could be found guilty of vol-
untary manslaughter without proof that such mitigating circumstances
were present.' 60 (See Addendum, page 62 of this article.)
157. People v. March, 95 111. App. 3d 46, 61-62, 419 N.E.2d 1212, 1223 (Green, J., concurring).
158. See supra text accompanying notes 25-28.
159. Id
160. See supra text accompanying note 123.
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
An adequate response is that the courts must construe the murder
statute and the voluntary manslaughter statute together. In determin-
ing what is necessary for a murder conviction when there is evidence of
passion-provocation or of imperfect justification, courts cannot focus
solely on the murder statute as if there were no voluntary manslaughter
statute, as the I.P.I. homicide instructions now do. Similarly, in deter-
mining what is necessary to sustain a voluntary manslaughter convic-
tion when murder is also in issue, courts cannot focus exclusively on
the voluntary manslaughter statute.
There is no room for the conclusion that the legislature intended to
punish as murder homicides accompanied by passion-provocation or
imperfect justification. It is hardly a radical approach to say that if the
offense is voluntary manslaughter, it is not also murder. Traditionally,
Illinois law has considered voluntary manslaughter as something be-
tween murder and a lawful act-an intermediate verdict which takes
into account human imperfection to avoid the extreme penalty for mur-
der without exonerating the accused for an unjustifed intentional or
knowing killing. 161
If voluntary manslaughter is viewed as an affirmative defense to
murder, additional issues remain: (1) Should the prosecution bear the
burden of proving the absence of mitigating circumstances to obtain a
murder conviction or should the defense bear the burden of proving the
presence of mitigating circumstances to obtain a voluntary manslaugh-
ter conviction, and (2) what should be the quantum of the burden?
The answer is found in the Illinois statutes. Once an affirmative
defense is in issue, the burden is on the prosecution to negate the de-
fense beyond a reasonable doubt. 162 The partial affirmative defense of
voluntary manslaughter should be treated like any other. Otherwise
great confusion could result. For example, in a jury trial where mur-
der, self-defense, and imperfect justification were at issue, it would be
very confusing to require the prosecution to negate self-defense evi-
dence beyond a reasonable doubt to obtain a conviction while requir-
ing the defense to establish imperfect justification to reduce the crime
from murder to voluntary manslaughter.
161. See, e.g., People v. Leonard, 83 Ill. 2d 411, 415 N.E.2d 358 (1981).
162. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 3-2 (1981) reads:
(a) "Affirmative defense" means that unless the State's evidence raises the issue
involving the alleged defense, the defendant, to raise the issue, must present some evi-
dence thereon.
(b) If the issue involved in an affirmative defense is raised then the State must
sustain the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as to that
issue together with all the other elements of the offense.
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Critics might raise two other objections. First, they might suggest
that allowing a voluntary manslaughter conviction without proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt of the element of passion-provocation or im-
perfect justification violates due process. But, as previously explained,
under the suggested approach, where murder is charged, voluntary
manslaughter would not be viewed as a separate crime, but rather as
the result of the successful interposition of a partial affirmative defense
to murder. 163 In Patterson v. New York,164 the United States Supreme
Court recognized that an affirmative defense approach in murder-vol-
untary manslaughter cases is consistent with the requirement that the
prosecution prove every element of an offense beyond a reasonable
doubt. The approach suggested for Illinois is even more favorable to
the accused than the New York approach in Patterson. In New York,
the accused had to establish the presence of mitigating circumstances in
order to reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter. Under this article's
suggested approach for Illinois, the prosecution would be required to
prove the absence of mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable
doubt once voluntary manslaughter was in issue.
Second, there is the objection that if the Illinois legislature had
intended an affirmative defense approach, it would have used that label
for voluntary manslaughter. The Supreme Court of Illinois, in a differ-
ent context, has said that it would not find that the legislature intended
an affirmative defense approach unless the legislature used the affirma-
tive defense terminology.1 65 However, an affirmative defense merely
reflects a particular allocation of burdens which is not always labeled
as such.166 If there are signs that such allocation is consistent with the
letter and the spirit of the statutes, it is not proper to conclude that the
legislature did not intend this allocation of burdens simply because it
did not provide an affirmative defense label. Thus, in 1979, the
Supreme Court of Illinois effectively adopted an affirmative defense
approach in another context where the legislature had not used the af-
firmative defense label.' 67
163. See supra text accompanying note 123.
164. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
165. People v. Smith, 71 111. 2d 95, 106, 374 N.E.2d 472, 476 (1978).
166. See generally the excellent analysis in Allen, Structuring Jury Decisionmaking in Criminal
Cases. A Unoed Constitutional Approach to Evidentiary Devices, 94 HARV. L. REV. 321 (1980).
167. See In re Greene, 76 I11. 2d 204, 390 N.E.2d 884 (1979). There the prosecution was re-
quired to prove that the accused committed a delinquent act, which was defined as commission of
a crime before the respondent's seventeenth birthday. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 702-2, 704-6
(1973). The Greene court decided that the prosecution did not have to prove that the respondent
was under seventeen unless he offered evidence suggesting that he had been seventeen or older on
the date of the alleged offense.
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VI. VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER AS A
SEPARATELY CHARGED OFFENSE
The treatment of voluntary manslaughter as a partial affirmative
defense to a charge of murder leaves one remaining problem. As previ-
ously indicated, sometimes justice requires that the prosecution charge
voluntary manslaughter rather than murder. 68 This will remain true
under the present proposal, for there will be situations where the prose-
cutor knows in advance that he will be unable to prove the absence of
the statutory mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.
Under such circumstances, the prosecutor must have the option of
charging the offense of voluntary manslaughter. Such a crime must
exist, with its elements specified in a statute. Voluntary manslaughter
cannot exist solely as the result of an affirmative defense to murder. If
voluntary manslaughter is defined as including the element of passion-
provocation or of imperfect justification, the prosecution must prove
the presence of such an element beyond a reasonable doubt. Under
state and federal decisions, there appears to be no escape from this di-
lemma.' 69 As previously indicated, this burden discourages prosecu-
tors from ever charging voluntary manslaughter, lest they run a risk of
losing to a "murder-or-nothing" claim. If the author's suggested af-
firmative defense approach is adopted, another problem would arise.
The allocation of the burden of proof as to voluntary manslaughter
would differ depending upon whether the original charge was murder
or voluntary manslaughter. If the charge was murder, the prosecutor
would have to prove the absence of mitigating circumstances. If the
charge was voluntary manslaughter, he must prove the presence of
such circumstances.
The solution is to allow the prosecution to charge voluntary man-
slaughter as a separate crime, but also to allow a withdrawal of that
charge in favor of a murder charge if the accused refuses to stipulate to
the presence of those mitigating circumstances which distinguish vol-
untary manslaughter from murder. 70 In this way, the prosecution
would never be required to introduce evidence to establish the presence
of mitigating circumstances. If the defense stipulated to such circum-
stances, the prosecution could proceed on a voluntary manslaughter
charge without risking a "murder-or-nothing" claim. If the defense re-
168. See supra text accompanying notes 68-71.
169. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
170. The author's suggested statutory language appears in the Appendix infra.
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fused to "admit" that there were mitigating circumstances, the prosecu-
tor could resort to a charge of murder.
The only defense argument is that cases forbidding prosecutorial
vindictiveness would prohibit elevation of the charge if the defense re-
fused to admit to the presence of one of the elements of the lesser of-
fense.'71 Because the statute provides fair notice that the charge will be
raised if the defense does not agree to "plead" to one of the elements of
the lesser charges, the decided cases indicate that the prosecutorial de-
cision to enhance the charges would be proper. 72 Moreover, the whole
tenor of the scheme would be benign. Its purpose would be to en-
courage a charge of voluntary manslaughter where today a prosecutor
would charge murder in order to avoid the possibility of a "murder-or-
nothing" claim if he charged voluntary manslaughter.
Finally, if a court invalidated a statute which called upon the ac-
cused to "admit" the presence of mitigating circumstances or face a
murder charge, under the proposal in the appendix, the state would be
left without a separate chargeable offense called voluntary manslaugh-
ter. Voluntary manslaughter would exist solely as an affirmative de-
fense to a charge of murder. Nothing in the United States Constitution
requires a state to provide a statute under which a prosecutor can
charge voluntary manslaughter, thereby casting upon himself the bur-
den of proving the presence of mitigating circumstances. A state is free
to treat voluntary manslaughter solely as an affirmative defense to a
murder charge. 173
CONCLUSION
Illinois decisions are confused and inconsistent in their treatment
of burdens in murder and voluntary manslaughter cases. This confu-
sion creates significant practical problems, particularly in jury trials
where both forms of verdict are submitted. The best solution would be
a legislative enactment which treats voluntary manslaughter as an af-
171. The prosecutorial vindictiveness argument had its origin in Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S.
21 (1974). There the Court held that it was impermissible for the prosecution to respond to a
defendant's invocation of his statutory right to a trial de novo by bringing a more serious charge
against him prior to the new trial.
172. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978), where the Court allowed the prosecutor
to increase the charge, as he had warned the accused that he might, after the accused refused to
plead guilty to the pending charge. See also Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212 (1978) (statutory
scheme which gave fair notice that greater penalty could be imposed only if the accused exercised
his right to trial was upheld), and United States v. Goodwin, 102 S. Ct. 2485 (1982) (refusing to
create presumption of vindictiveness whenever prosecutor increases charges after the accused has
asserted a right in pre-trial proceedings).
173. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
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firmative defense while still allowing the prosecution the option of
charging voluntary manslaughter as a separate crime. If the legislature
does not act, the drafters of the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions and
the judiciary can and should adopt the affirmative defense approach.
ADDENDUM
On March 25, 1983, the Illinois Supreme Court decided People v.
Fausz, No. 56940. A petition for rehearing is pending as this article
goes to print. A jury had convicted Fausz of voluntary manslaughter
and had acquitted him of murder. On appeal, Fausz argued that be-
cause there was no evidence of either provocation or imperfect justifi-
cation, the court should vacate the voluntary manslaughter conviction.
The prosecution responded that where the evidence would sustain a
murder conviction, a reviewing court should uphold a voluntary man-
slaughter conviction, even in the absence of proof of either provocation
or imperfect justification. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected the
prosecution argument, holding that such mitigating circumstances must
be established to sustain a voluntary manslaughter conviction, even
where the original charge was murder.
Fausz makes it improper for a lower court or for the Illinois Pat-
tern Jury Instructions Committee to adopt the jury instructions which
have been suggested in this article. Absent either a statutory amend-
ment (as has been proposed in the current Illinois legislative session) or
Illinois Supreme Court reconsideration of Fausz, the jury must be in-
structed that proof of passion-provocation or imperfect justification is
essential to a voluntary manslaughter conviction. It remains an open
question whether proof of the absence of such mitigating circumstances
is essential to a murder conviction.
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APPENDIX
A. RECOMMENDED TEXT OF VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER STATUTE
9.2 Voluntary Manslaughter. When the State proves beyond a rea-
sonable doubt the elements of murder, as defined in Section 9-1, it shall
be a partial affirmative defense, reducing the grade of the offense to
voluntary manslaughter, if, at the time of the killing, the offender
(a) was acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting from
serious provocation by:
(1) the individual killed, or
(2) another whom the offender endeavored to kill, but he
negligently or accidentally caused the death of the individual killed; or
(b) believed the circumstances to be such that, if they existed,
they would have justified or exonerated the killing under the principles
stated in Article 7 of this Code, but his belief was unreasonable.
(c) For the purposes of subsection (a), serious provocation is con-
duct sufficient to excite an intense passion in a reasonable person.
(d) Voluntary manslaughter is a Class 1 felony.
(e) When the charging authority is satisfied that, at the time of
the killing, there existed circumstances under Section 9-2(a) or Section
9-2(b), such as to reduce the offense of murder to voluntary manslaugh-
ter, that authority may file a charge of voluntary manslaughter. In such
case, the indictment, information, or complaint shall allege the ele-
ments of murder as defined in Section 9-1 and shall specify the exist-
ence of circumstances under Section 9-2(a) or 9-2(b) sufficient to reduce
the grade of the offense to voluntary manslaughter. The accused, at
arraignment on a charge of voluntary manslaughter, or before trial,
shall be called upon to enter a plea of "nolo contendere" or "denial" as
to the existence of those specified circumstances. If the plea is "nolo
contendere" as to those circumstances, the prosecution, to sustain a
charge of voluntary manslaughter, need not prove the specified circum-
stances under Section 9-2(a) or 9-2(b), and need only prove the ele-
ments of the offense under Section 9-1. If the plea as to the specified
circumstances is "denial," the prosecution must also prove beyond a
reasonable doubt the existence of the specified circumstances. Nothing
shall prohibit the charging authority, after a plea of "denial" to the
special circumstances, from reconsidering its decision to charge volun-
tary manslaughter rather than murder, or from thereafter charging
murder by indictment, information, or complaint, as otherwise pro-
vided by law.
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(f) The provisions of Section 9-2(e) shall be deemed severable
from the rest of Section 9-2. If Section 9-2(e) is invalidated, the charge
of voluntary manslaughter shall not be brought as a separate offense.
If Section 9-2(e) is invalidated, a defendant may be deemed guilty of
voluntary manslaughter only when he is charged with murder under
Section 9-1 and he successfully raises a partial affirmative defense
under Section 9-2(a) or Section 9-2(b).
B. RECOMMENDED TEXT OF PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS
7.02-A Murder Issues Where Jury Is To Consider Both Murder and
Voluntary Manslaughter-Provocation
To sustain the charge of murder, the State must prove the
following propositions:
First: That the defendant performed the acts which
caused the death of ; and
Second: That when the defendant did so,
[1] he intended to kill or do great bodily harm to
or
[2] he knew that his act would cause death or great bod-
ily harm to
or
[3] he knew that his acts created a strong probability of
death or great bodily harm to
or
[4] he [(was attempting to commit) (was committing)]
the offense of
Third: That when the defendant did so,
[1] he did not act under a sudden and intense passion
resulting from serious provocation by another;
[and]
[2] he did not act under a sudden and intense passion
resulting from serious provocation by some other
person he endeavored to kill, but he negligently or
accidentally killed
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each
one of these propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt,
you should find the defendant guilty of murder.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any
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one of these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, you should find the defendant not guilty of murder.
7.02-B Murder Issues Where Jury Is To Consider Both Murder and
Voluntary Manslaughter-Intentional-Belief of Justification
To sustain the charge of murder, the State must prove the
following propositions:
First: That the defendant performed the acts which
caused the death of ; and
Second: That when the defendant did so,
[1] he intended to kill or do great bodily harm to
or
[2] he knew that his acts would cause death or great
bodily harm to
or
[31 he knew that his acts created a strong probability of
death or great bodily harm to
or
[4] he [(was attempting to commit) (was committing)]
the offense of
Third: That when the defendant did so he did not believe
that circumstances existed which would have justified the kill-
ing of
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each
one of these propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt,
you should find the defendant guilty of murder.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any
one of these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, you should find the defendant not guilty of murder.
7.04-A Voluntary Manslaughter Issues Where Jury Is to Consider
Both Murder and Voluntary Manslaughter-Provocation
To sustain the charge of voluntary manslaughter, the
State must prove the following propositions:
First: That the defendant performed the acts which
caused the death of ; and
Second: That when the defendant did so,
[1] he intended to kill or do great bodily harm to
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[2] he knew that his acts would cause death or great
bodily harm to
or
[3] he knew that his acts created a strong probability of
death or great bodily harm to
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each
one of these propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt,
you should find the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any
one of these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, you should find the defendant not guilty of voluntary
manslaughter.
7.06-A Voluntary Manslaughter Issues Where Jury Is To Consider
Both Murder and Voluntary Manslaughter-Imperfect
Justification
To sustain the charge of voluntary manslaughter the
State must prove the following propositions:
First: That the defendant performed the acts which
caused the death of ; and
Second: That when the defendant did so,
[1] he intended to kill or do great bodily harm to-
or
[2] he knew that his acts would cause death or great
bodily harm to
or
[31 he knew that his acts created a strong probability of
death or great bodily harm to
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each
one of these propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt,
you should find the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any
one of these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, you should find the defendant not guilty of voluntary
manslaughter.
